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Abstract
My dissertation consists of two essays that investigate dynamic ﬁnancial phenomena using semi-parametric
competing risks models. The ﬁrst essay analyzes the determinants of corporate defaults and mergers. The
second essay investigates how sell-side analysts make recommendation revisions facing various incentives at
diﬀerent points in time.
The ﬁrst essay, Contagious Corporate Default, analyzes contagious corporate defaultdefault by one
ﬁrm that raises the likelihood of defaults by similarly-situated ﬁrms, while possibly lowering defaults of
competitors. We use a semi-parametric competing risks model that incorporates non-linear relationships
between corporate defaults/mergers and risk factors. We use two-dimensional penalized tensor-product
splines to ﬂexibly model default correlations among ﬁrms, including their time dependence. The direct
impact of one ﬁrm's default on default intensities of other ﬁrms is quantiﬁed by the ﬁnancial distance
between them, as captured by the 12-month trailing correlation in their equity returns. We also allow
for non-linear impacts of observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic default risk factors and unobservable
frailties that capture common unobservable macroeconomic risk factors. We document large intra-industry
contagion eﬀects in defaults and mergers. The contagious impact of a default takes time to cumulate, peaking
at lags of about 90-120 days, before declining. The impacts of many ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables
are highly non-linear: many only exhibit signiﬁcant impacts on default once they are above or below some
critical level. Our model better estimates the clustering of defaults and more precisely predicts ﬁrms' credit
risks than existing parametric hazard models, delivering massive improvements in out-of-sample predictive
power.
My second essay, Hazardous Analysts: Reputation Management and the Duration of Recommendations,
investigates how incentives to manage appearances for their customer audiences appear to drive analyst
recommendation revisions, using a semiparametric competing risks hazard model that accommodates both
unobserved heterogeneity and the time-varying eﬀects of covariates on analysts' recommendations to uncover
the determinants of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions. We ﬁnd that analysts tend to keep past
good accurate recommendations for too long, and to drop past bad inaccurate recommendations too
ii
quickly. That is, incentives to maintain a `good' reputationa good-looking recommendation list in front of
customersappear to aggravate rather than alleviate conﬂicts of interest. More generally, we exhaustively
characterize the impacts of covariates on recommendation changes. For example, we ﬁnd that the information
content of earnings announcements is fully incorporated into recommendations within one week, and that
the likelihood of revisions falls sharply with experience over an analyst's ﬁrst three years, but then plateaus.
Using the predictive power of future returns as the criterion, we show that, overall, analysts appear prescient:
downgrades (upgrades) are more likely when future returns are bad (good). However, the investment values
of downgrades decline when analysts make their decision driven by past performance pressure.
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Chapter 1
Contagious Corporate Default
1.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of corporate default has long been a paramount concern for investors, gov-
ernment regulators and economists. The recent credit crisis served to highlight the importance of predicting
default. Despite an enormous volume of research on this topic, we still have a limited understanding of
which economic factors drive corporate defaults and how they interact with each other to determine corpo-
rate default intensities.
The contribution of our paper is to develop a ﬂexible semi-parametric hazard model to estimate condi-
tional corporate default probabilities that accounts for both contagious defaultdefault by one ﬁrm that
can raise the likelihood of default by other, closely ﬁnancially-connected ﬁrmsand competing risk events
such as mergers and acquisitions. Exploiting the ﬂexibility of our semi-parametric competing risks model,
we allow the contagious impact of a default to hinge in complex ways on the time elapsed since default,
and we allow for the non-linear impacts of both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common (observable and unobservable)
macroeconomic risk factors on default and merger intensities. Incorporating these sources yields massive
improvements in model ﬁt and out-of-sample predictive power.
In practice, default by one ﬁrm may adversely aﬀect other ﬁrms, for example, due to a network of
common contractual and ﬁnancial relationships. Thus, one ﬁrm's default can raise the ﬁnancial stress on
closely-connected ﬁrms, raising their default risks, and causally driving clusters of default. However, in
other settings, default of a negatively-linked competitor may beneﬁt rival ﬁrms in a market, in which case
the rivals may face lower probabilities of default. To determine how the stochastic default intensity processes
of ﬁrms interact with each other we decompose a ﬁrm's conditional default intensity function into ordinary
and contagious components. We quantify the direct impact of one ﬁrm's default on other ﬁrms in its industry
using the ﬁnancial distance between them, as measured by the 12-month trailing correlation of their equity
returns. We show that default by a closely-linked ﬁrm, as captured by highly positively correlated returns,
sharply raises another ﬁrm's default intensities; while default by a competing ﬁrm, as captured by a negative
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correlation in recent returns, lowers its default intensities. We further show that the contagious impact of
default has a delayed temporal impact: the adverse impacts of one ﬁrm's default cumulate for a few months,
before trailing away for ﬁrms that succeed in staving oﬀ near-term default. These ﬁndings have implications
for the pricing of CDOs and the risk management of portfolios that are exposed to correlated defaults.
The empirical analysis of corporate defaults dates back to Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Ohlson
(1980). These studies estimate single-period classiﬁcation models using accounting variables and introduce
credit risk measures such as Altman's `Z-score' and Ohlson's `O-score'. These accounting-based models focus
on explaining corporate defaults using ﬁrm-speciﬁc information drawn from a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial statements.
In recent years, this literature has been dominated by hazard models. Those models typically use a Cox
proportional-hazard model, specifying the distribution of transformed default time or baseline hazard rate
as a Weibull or Logistic distribution. For example, Shumway (2001), Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Duﬃe et al.
(2007) developed hazard models based on accounting information, market information and macroeconomic
conditions.
All of those models implicitly or explicitly rely on the doubly-stochastic assumption; that is, conditional
on observable risk factors, the default times of diﬀerent ﬁrms are independent. While the doubly-stochastic
assumption simpliﬁes model computation and estimation, Das et al. (2007) show that it does not ﬁt the
default data well. In particular, defaults for US-listed Industrial ﬁrms between 1979 and 2004 are far more
correlated than would be implied by this assumption. Using the model suggested by Duﬃe et al. (2007),
Das et al. (2007) show that after controlling for observable covariates, corporate defaults were persistently
far higher than predicted during some periods (e.g., 1986-1991), and persistently far lower in other periods
(e.g., the mid-nineties).
Several approaches have been proposed to address this excess clustering of default. Duﬃe et al. (2009)
argue that default risks are not only determined by observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc and market-wide covariates,
but also by unobservable risk factors, `frailty'. That is, they argue that corporate defaults cluster because
all ﬁrms are hit by a common, unobservable macroeconomic risk factor. Thus, default by one ﬁrm reveals
information about this unobservable macroeconomic risk, and while one ﬁrm's default does not causally aﬀect
another's default risk, it is positively correlated, and therefore appears to raise their default hazards. Their
dynamic `frailty' (random eﬀects) model of conditional default intensities suggests the importance of these
unobservable macroeconomics risk factors for the clustering of default. One limitation of this approach is that
it, in essence, collects all unexplained default intensities into time-varying random eﬀects, without providing
the underlying economic primitives. Omitting these underlying primitives can distort the estimated impacts
of these unobservable macroeconomic risk factors.
2
Our paper shows that explicitly accounting for these primitives matters. We build on the observation that
in addition to common unobservable macroeconomic risk factors, ﬁrm defaults are likely to be correlated
causally through networks of contractual, ﬁnancial and competitive ﬁrm relationships. For example, the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered a ﬁnancial tsunami, dramatically increasing credit spreads and
default risks for all ﬁrms with direct exposure to Lehman Brothers. So, too, the bankruptcy of auto parts
manufacture Delphi in 2005 jeopardized production of General Motors and increased its default hazard. Such
contagion provides a channel through which defaults become clustered. Conversely, in other contexts, default
by one ﬁrm could reduce the likelihood of default for other ﬁrms  something that cannot be explained by
exposure to a common unobserved macroeconomic factor. In particular, default of a competitor could aid
the remaining ﬁrms in a sector. For example, Best Buy beneﬁted from the bankruptcy of its major rival,
Circuit City Stores Inc. The analysis by Jorion and Zhang (2007) of credit default swaps (CDS) market data
provides evidence of this competitive eﬀect. They argue that such negative default correlations are caused
by the fact that the remaining ﬁrms can capture new clients from the displaced ﬁrm, or generally gain
market power. Stock market investors also realize this impact: KeyBanc Capital Market analyst Bradley
Thomas upgraded Best Buy to buy" from hold" just before Circuity City ﬁled bankruptcy, and supported
his revised recommendation by the statementBest Buy could reap some beneﬁts from the impending
bankruptcy of Circuit City Stores Inc.
Motivated by these features of U.S. corporate defaults, we propose a hazard model that decomposes the
conditional default hazard function into an ordinary component and a contagious component. By explicitly
modeling default contagion as a function of the ﬁnancial distance between ﬁrms in the same industry, our
model can capture the true mechanism though which default risks spread. To account for the evolving
temporal eﬀects of default, we model the complex interactional eﬀects between the ﬁnancial distance with
default ﬁrms and time elapsed since default using two-dimensional penalized tensor-product splines, a ﬂexible
and computationally eﬃcient way to model interactions between continuous covariates.
Duﬃe et al. (2009) only model the default intensity as linearly dependent on a small set of explanatory
variables. As a result, their ﬁnding regarding the importance of frailty eﬀectsthe magnitudes of the
unobserved macroeconomic risk factorscould be biased upward due to mis-speciﬁcation. Bharath and
Shumway (2008) ﬁnd that the Merton distance to default, which is the most signiﬁcant predictor in Duﬃe
et al. (2009), does not appear to produce a suﬃcient statistic for default, and that its predictive power is
due to the functional form implied by the Merton (1974) model. Their results indicate that the relationship
between a ﬁrm's capital structure and its default intensity is highly non-linear. So, too, measures of a
ﬁrm's access to liquid capital, such as its cash holdings, may only be relevant to a ﬁrm's default intensity
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when its cash position is weak and/or when it is facing ﬁnancial constraints. To address this, we allow
observable sources of ﬁrm speciﬁc and macroeconomic default risk to have non-linear impacts on corporate
default and merger intensities, and we allow for unobservable frailties that capture a common unobservable
macroeconomic risk factor. This allows us to provide a comprehensive description of how diﬀerent risk
factors aﬀect corporate default and merger activities.
Our semi-parametric hazard model also explicitly accounts for another potential source of downward bias
in the estimates of default hazardscompeting risks associated with merger and acquisition. It has been
long understood that bankruptcy avoidance could be a motive for merger (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979). In
a controversial discussion of U.S. antitrust policy, Dewey (1961) stated that most mergers [...] are merely
a civilized alternative to bankruptcy or the voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from falling to rising
ﬁrms. For example, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America on September 15, 2008 to avoid having
to ﬁle for bankruptcy protection like Lehman Brothers. If, in lieu of ﬁling for bankruptcy, a ﬁnancially-
distressed ﬁrm manages to merge or be acquired, then treating this M&A as a randomly censored event
would bias the default hazard downward. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions occur in waves, high when a
sector is doing particularly well or poorly. To account for the fact that mergers and acquisitions may be
high both due to empire building or because ﬁrms are in ﬁnancial distress, we include the Merton distance
to default, which proxies a ﬁrm's distress status, in modeling acquisition intensity.
By incorporating the competing risks of mergers and contagious component of default hazards into an
unifying hazard model using penalized splines, we better estimate the correlated corporate default process,
and better predict ﬁrms' credit risks. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. public ﬁrms during 1990-2010, we
provide strong evidence of intra-industry contagion after controlling for observed covariates and with a time-
varying baseline hazard function (deterministic time eﬀects corresponding to the dynamic random eﬀects
in Duﬃe et al. (2009)). Contagion eﬀects are quite strong when the ﬁrms' trailing stock returns are highly
correlated, while defaults exhibit competitive eﬀects" when ﬁrms' returns are negative correlated. The
impact of one ﬁrm's default on the default intensities of closely ﬁnancially-connected ﬁrms peaks after three
to four months, raising the hazard into default by about 28 percent when correlation in their stock returns
is around 0.5, before gradually decaying. We also ﬁnd that the impacts of many ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates
on default and merger intensities are highly non-linear. Many ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures of proﬁtability and
liquidity (e.g., working capital/total assets, market-to-book, total liabilities/total assets) exhibit threshold
eﬀects for the hazard into default, only signiﬁcantly aﬀecting default intensities once they become indicative
of a ﬁrm in ill-health. However, once these measures cross threshold levels they sharply raise hazards into
exit, for example, by a factor of 3 for ﬁrms with very low return over assets ratios and a factor of 7 for ﬁrms
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with high levels of liabilities relative to assets. In contrast, as a ﬁrst approximation, the hazards into merger
and acquisitions are more linearly related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates, and are positively related to measures
of ﬁrm proﬁtability, but negatively related to measures of a ﬁrm's level of illiquidity.
These results make tremendous intuitive sense. First, only relatively unhealthy ﬁrms are plausible can-
didates for default, so that variations in measures of ﬁrm proﬁtability, levels of indebtedness and access to
liquid assets do not signiﬁcantly alter a healthy ﬁrm's default intensity. In contrast, the levels of these mea-
sures matter greatly for the ability of an unhealthy ﬁrm to stave oﬀ default. Second, while only unhealthy
ﬁrms exit into default, there are two types of targets for mergergrowing and proﬁtable ﬁrms that may
merge to exploit synergies (and are not targets for default), and ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress with low working
capital and high liabilities relative to assets. Collectively, these results highlight the importance of modeling
the non-linear and varying impacts of ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates on default and merger intensities.
We formally test the importance of accounting for both contagious default, and for the non-linear impacts
of covariates. In sample, we compare the ﬁt of our full semi-parametric model with a benchmark dynamic
frailty model that has no contagious components and assume that covariates only exert linear impacts;
in eﬀect we compare the ﬁt of our model with a benchmark analogue of Duﬃe et al. (2009). We ﬁnd
that the pseduo-R2 improves remarkably from 18% for the benchmark model to 29% for our full semi-
parametric model. The likelihood ratio test statistic, −2log L(benchmark)L(semi−parametric) is 478.05, with a P-value <
0.0001, emphasizes the astonishing improvement in ﬁt. We then perform out-of-sample tests using 75% of
the sample to estimate the models, and then predicting the probability of defaults for the other 25%. Our
full semi-parametric hazard model does far better than the benchmark model at forecasting out-of-sample
default probabilities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes
the hazard model and estimation procedure. Section 4 discusses our sample and the diﬀerent measures
of determinants. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 assesses the model's out-of-sample
performance, and section 7 concludes. Appendices contain details on variable deﬁnitions, and our estimation
and inference approaches.
1.2 Related Literature
There is extensive evidence that corporate defaults are temporally correlated (see, e.g., Lang and Stulz,
1992). Researchers such as Das et al. (2007) have shown that defaults cluster in time. The current credit
crunch provides further evidence of clustering. For example, once commercial lender CIT Group Inc. ﬁled
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for bankruptcy, the total number of banks that failed in 2009 grew to 115. The correlation in defaults has
also been documented using the market prices of credit derivatives. For instance, just before ﬁnancially-
distressed Bear Sterns was acquired by JP Morgan Chase, the prices of senior tranches of Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDO) jump up 10 times relative to prices six months earlier. Using Credit Default Swap
(CDS) market prices, Jorion and Zhang (2007) ﬁnd evidence of intra-industry contagion associated with
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
The literature has proposed two complementary drivers for the observed clustering of default. One
explanation attributes default clustering to exposure to common observable and unobservable macroeconomic
risks that aﬀect the default probabilities of all ﬁrms. Blume and Keim (1991) document the high aggregate
default rates in business cycle downturns. Duﬃe et al. (2007) link clustering of default to macroeconomic
covariates such as the 3-month T-bill rate and trailing one-year return on the S&P 500 index. Das et al.
(2007) test whether defaults are signiﬁcantly more correlated than would be suggested by the assumption
that correlation of defaults can be explained by the observed covariates including business cycle indicators.
They ﬁnd that even after controlling for observed variables, excessive default correlation remains. This
led Duﬃe et al. (2009) to model the common risk factor interpretation by including a dynamic `frailty'
(random eﬀect) component in their hazard model; they argue that such `frailty' represents unobservable
macroeconomic risk factors.
The other approach explains the correlation in default times via contagionone default event directly or
indirectly triggers more default events. In this literature, copula-based models are commonly used to model
the correlated defaults caused by contagion. The contagious eﬀects are speciﬁed by a copula function that
decomposes the joint default probabilities into ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal default probabilities (e.g., Glasserman
and Li, 2005; Chen and Glasserman, 2008, etc.). Lando and Nielsen (2010) estimate an intensity model
known as a Hawkes point process, which explicitly includes a contagion eﬀect. In their model, correlation
between defaults depends on the time since last default (eﬀects decay exponentially) and the size of the de-
faulting ﬁrm (larger size, higher impact) and the contagion component is included additively in the intensity
function. They use Ogata (1978)'s simulation algorithm in their parameter estimation and ﬁnd no evidence
of contagion.
Azizpour et al. (2012) estimate the aggregate default intensity using a self-exciting model in which
contagion eﬀects are characterized by an additional response jump process. In contrast to Lando and Nielsen
(2010), they ﬁnd strong evidence of contagion eﬀects. Our paper uses a conceptually diﬀerent approach.
We ﬁt a bottom-up model of correlated default intensities for individual ﬁrms, whereas they estimate the
aggregate default intensity, which does not depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates. Moreover, unlike our semi-
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parametric competing risks model, their aggregate default intensity speciﬁcation does not take into account
non-linear covariate eﬀects or competing risk events (mergers and acquisitions).
1.3 Model and Estimation
1.3.1 The model
In this section, we ﬁrst present the competing risks model. We then discuss how we specify the contagious
component of a ﬁrm's default hazard function.
Let n be the total number of ﬁrms and let Ci = (Ti, Ji) denote the competing risks data on ﬁrm i, where
Ti is the event's time (default, M&A, or censoring), and Ji is the event type, with j = 1 indicating default
and j = 2 indicating M&A. Throughout, the censoring mechanism is assumed to be independent of the
survival time conditional on observed covariates and unobserved random eﬀects. We treat default and M&A
as competing failure types.
We let λj(t) represent the probability of experiencing a type j event at time t, provided that no event has
occurred before t. The cause-speciﬁc hazard function λj(t) is assumed to have a multiplicative structure,
with an ordinary competing risks component hj(t), and a contagious component cj(t):
λj(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr
[
t ≤ T ji < t+ dt, J = j | T ji ≥ t
]
dt
= hj(t)cj(t). (1.1)
The overall survival function, i.e., the probability of no events up to time t, is
S(t) = Pr
[
T ji ≥ t
]
= 1− F (t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
λ(τ)dτ
}
= exp
{
−
∫ t
0
2∑
j=1
λj (τ)dτ
}
, (1.2)
where F (t) is the conditional cumulative density function, and the hazard function is assumed to have an
additive structure, i.e., λ(t) = λ1 (t) + λ2 (t) .
For any ﬁrm i at time t, we observe (ti, ji). The likelihood function is totally determined by the cause-
speciﬁc hazard function, λji (t) = h
j
i (t)c
j
i (t),
L =
2∏
j=1
N∏
i=1
λj (ti)
1(ji=j) · S(ti)
=
2∏
j=1
N∏
i=1
λj
(
ti
)1(ji=j)
exp
{
−
∫ ti
0
2∑
j=1
λj(τ)dτ
}
. (1.3)
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The ordinary competing risks component hj(t) takes the form:
hji (t) = h
j
0(t) exp
{
L∑
l=1
f jl (xil(t)) + z
′
iβ
j + µji
}
, (1.4)
where hj0(t) is the baseline hazard function for risk j that captures common unobserved macroeconomic
risk factors; f jl (xil(t)) is the nonlinear eﬀect of a continuous ﬁrm-speciﬁc (e.g., accounting variables) or
macroeconomic covariate xil(t);1 β
j is a vector of standard linear eﬀects2; and µji ∼ N(0, θ) (i = 1, · · · , N)
is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc frailty (random eﬀect) for each competing risk j = 1, 2.
The contagious component cj(t) captures ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm transmission of default risks. We focus on intra-
industry contagion and default correlation. Accordingly, the set of ﬁrms in default that aﬀect ﬁrm i is
deﬁned to be the set of all ﬁrms Ki(t) that are in the same industry as ﬁrm i and defaulted within the
twelve months prior to t.3 We allow the contagious component to depend on both the ﬁnancial distance
dik between ﬁrm i and defaulting ﬁrm k, and the elapsed time since that default eik. Thus, the aggregate
impact of the contagious component on ﬁrm i is given by a weighted sum of the impacts of each defaulting
ﬁrm, where the weight is an unknown function of the two continuous variables dik and eik,
cji (t) = exp
 ∑
k∈Ki(t)
f j(dik, eik)
 . (1.5)
Plugging in equation (1.4) and (1.5), and reparameterizing the baseline hazard rate hj0(t) by exp{gj0(t)},
we extend the cause-speciﬁc hazard function to the nonparametric multiplicative model:
λji (t) = exp{ηji (t)},
where
ηji (t) = g
j
0(t) +
L∑
l=1
f jl (xil(t)) + z
′
iβ
j + µji +
∑
k∈Ki(t)
f j(dik, eik). (1.6)
Here gj0(t) = log{hj0(t)} represents the log-baseline hazard, which is given by some unknown smooth function.
1To simply the expression, we do not distinguish ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates from macroeconomic covariates that are common
to all ﬁrms. The subscribe i of xil(t) is redundant for macroeconomic covariates.
2We only model eﬀects non-linearly if tests indicate that linear eﬀects are inappropriate.
3As in Chava and Jarrow (2004), we group industries into ten sectors based on SIC classiﬁcation. Focusing on intra-
industry credit contagion helps us distinguish contagion, which varies with the ﬁnancial distance between ﬁrms, from unobserved
macroeconomic shocks that have common impacts on all ﬁrms.
8
1.3.2 Semiparametric Duration Model
To ﬁt this ﬂexible model, we approximate the unknown smooth functions gj0(t) and g
j
l nonparametrically with
penalized B-splines (P-splines) and approximate the two-dimensional function f j(dik, eik) with penalized
tensor product B-splines. We describe this approach in Appendix B. See Eilers and Marx (1996, 2003) for
a comprehensive introduction to the theory of penalized B-splines (P-splines) and their multi-dimensional
extension, tensor product P-splines.
P-spline Representation
To obtain a ﬂexible nonparametric representation of the unspeciﬁed functions, we approximate the baseline
function gj0(t), as
gj0(t) =
M0∑
m=1
γj0mBm(t),
and the nonlinear eﬀects of covariates as
f jl (xl(t)) =
Ml∑
m=1
γjlmBm(xl(t)),
where the basis functions Bm are cubic B-spline functions. The unknown contagious eﬀect
cji (t) = exp
{∑
k∈K(t) f
j(dik, eik)
}
is approximated by the tensor product of one-dimensional cubic B-splines,
f j(dik, eik) =
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
γpqBp(dik)Bq(eik).
That is, we generate the B-spline basic functions for ﬁnancial distance and time since default, and calculate
all pairwise products of the basis functions. Interchanging the summation over default ﬁrms and B-spline
terms, we write the contagious eﬀect as
log
(
cji (t)
)
=
∑
k∈Ki(t)
f j(dik, eik)
=
∑
k∈Ki(t)
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
γpqBp(dik)Bq(eik)
=
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
γpq
∑
k∈Ki(t)
Bp(dik)Bq(eik).
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Now equation (1.6) can be written as:
ηji (t) =
M0∑
m=1
γj0mBm(t) +
L∑
l=1
Ml∑
m=1
γjlmBm(xil(t)) + z
′
iβ
j + µji +
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
γpq
∑
k∈Ki(t)
Bp(dik)Bq(eik). (1.7)
1.4 Data and Measurement
Our sample period extends from January, 1990 to December, 2010. The corporate default data are from
Standard and Poor's (S&P) Creditpro database, and the CRSP/Compustat database (data items AFTNT33,
AFTNT34, and AFTNT35). The data set consists of all ﬁrms included in S&P Creditpro and have a
common identiﬁer in CRSP/Compustat database. Following prior research, we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC
codes 60106799) and utility ﬁrms (SIC codes 49004949) from the sample. Data on the timing of mergers
are obtained from Thomson Financial's SDC Platinum M&A database. The date of a merger is given by
its initial public announcement date. We only examine the intensity of a ﬁrm's initial default or merger,
dropping any observations for a ﬁrm once it has defaulted or been acquired during our sample period. Exits
of ﬁrms from our database for reasons other than default or merger are categorized as Other-exit, and are
treated as random censoring.
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Figure 1.1: Quarterly number of defaults and mergers. The number of defaults and mergers in our data set
for each quarter between 1990 and 2010.
Thus, our sample consists of all U.S. public ﬁrms with bonds covered in S&P Creditpro, for which we
can also obtain stock market and accounting information from the CRSP and Compustat. This leaves us
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with a total of 2,424 ﬁrms with 471 defaults and 909 mergers. Figure 1.1 shows the number of defaults and
mergers in our sample in each quarter of our sample period.
1.4.1 Covariates
Distance to Default
In both academic and industry research, a ﬁrm's distance to default, which is a volatility-adjusted measure
of leverage, has been found to be a signiﬁcant predictor of corporate default. Moody's KMV developed a
successful proprietary estimator of default probabilities, estimated default frequency (EDF), based on the
Merton (1974) model. Several academic studies (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Duﬃe
et al., 2007) have documented the predictive power of a ﬁrm's distance to default for default probabilities.
We use the distance to default as a covariate in our hazard regression model.
The calculation of a ﬁrm's distance to default is based on the classic models of Black and Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1974), in which equity is viewed as a European call option on the value of the ﬁrm's assets.
The strike price of the call option is equal to the face value of the ﬁrm's liabilities. In the Merton (1974)
bond pricing model, a ﬁrm's asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dV = µV dt+ σV V dB, (1.8)
where V is the ﬁrm's market value, µ is the expected continuous return on V , σV is the volatility of the
ﬁrm's assets, and dB is a standard Brownian motion. If a ﬁrm's liabilities mature at time T , then the market
value of its equity as a function of its total assets is given by the Black-Scholes-Merton Formula,
E = VN (d1)− e−rTFN (d2), (1.9)
where E is the market value of the ﬁrm's equity, F is the face value of the ﬁrm's liabilities, r is the risk-free
rate, N (.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function,
d1 =
ln(V/F ) + (r + 0.5σ2V )T
σV
√
T
(1.10)
and
d2 = d1 − σV
√
T . (1.11)
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To obtain a ﬁrm's distance to default, we simultaneously solve the call option equation (15) and the equation
that relates the volatility of the ﬁrm's value to the volatility of its equity,
σE =
VN (d1)σV
E
. (1.12)
Then, using the two nonlinear equations, (15) and (18), we calculate the implied default probabilities using
the value and volatility of a ﬁrm's equity,
DD =
ln(V/F ) + (µ+ 0.5σ2V )T
σV
√
T
. (1.13)
V and σV can be calculated using a two-step iterative algorithm, as in Vassalou and Xing (2004), which starts
with an initial value of the asset volatility, such as σE , and repeats the two iterative steps until convergence
obtains. The two-step iterative algorithm is:
• For the ith iteration, calculate V̂ it , where t = 0, · · · , T by plugging the observed equity value data Et,
where t = 0, · · · , T and current estimated σ̂iV into equation (15).
• Compute the implied asset return Rˆi = log
(
Vˆt/ ˆVt−1
)
and update the asset drift and volatility:
(
σ̂i+1
)2
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
R̂it −Rit
)
µ̂i+1 = Rit +
1
2
(
σ̂i+1
)2
,
where Rit =
1
T
∑T
t=1 R̂
i
t.
This algorithm can be viewed as a degenerate EM algorithm with an E-step that has a one-to-one relationship
(Duan et al., 2005). Therefore, it produces Maximum Likelihood estimates of the asset's volatility and value.
Firm-Speciﬁc Accounting and Market-Based Covariates
Despite the popularity of distance to default as a credit risk measure, Merton's (1974) model makes some
unrealistic assumptions. It assumes that the market value of assets fully characterizes a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial
health and its probability of default. This means that if a ﬁrm's asset value is high enough, temporarily
insuﬃcient balance sheet liquidityan inability of a ﬁrm to meet its current liabilitiesis irrelevant. To
account for factors such as liquidity that may trigger default, we include ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates that measure
a ﬁrm's proﬁtability, capital structure, and ﬁnancial liquidity; and we include market-based variables that
contain information from the equity market.
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We list the variables and their construction below:
• Return on assets (ROA): the ratio of net income to total assets.
• Net income growth: net income minus the previous quarter's net income divided by total assets.
• Sales growth: current quarter sales divided by previous quarter sales minus one.
• Total liabilities: the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
• Cash holdings: the ratio of the sum of cash and short-term investments to the total assets.
• Working capital: current assets minus current liabilities over total assets.
• Age of ﬁrm: the number of calendar days the ﬁrm has been listed as a public company.
• Size: the value of total assets divided by the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers.
• Excess equity return: trailing one quarter excess equity returns relative to S&P index.
• Market-to-Book ratio: the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value.
All accounting variables are constructed using Compustat quarterly data. To control for seasonal eﬀects,
we take the trailing four-quarter average of ROA, net income growth, and sales growth before including
these variables in the model. Since accounting statements are usually released months after the reporting
period, we lag all accounting variables by one quarter to make sure of the predictability of our model.
Macroeconomic Covariates
Following prior literature, we also include macroeconomic covariates that capture the impact of market-wide
conditions on default and merger intensity:
• Treasury rate: three-month US Treasury bill rate (%).
• SP500: trailing 1-quarter return on the S&P500 index.
• Corporate bond yield spreads: average Aaa-to-Baa bond yield spread.
Measurement of Financial Distance
We measure the ﬁnancial distance between any pair of ﬁrms by the pairwise correlation of their daily returns
over the previous 12 months. This pairwise correlation not only captures contagion eﬀects" (with positive
correlation), but also competition eﬀects" (with negative correlations). A beneﬁt of using the correlation in
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equity returns to measure the ﬁnancial distance between ﬁrms is the good quality and availability of return
data. Nevertheless, using equity returns to estimate default correlations has sometimes been criticized
because it ignores the leverage in the capital structure and the links between equity correlation and credit
quality are not obvious. As a result, implied asset correlations and spread correlations have also been used
as alternatives. Here, these criticisms are less of a concern, because we do not impose a particular functional
form on how the contagious component cji (t) = exp
{∑
k∈K(t) f
j(dik, eik)
}
depends on the equity return
correlations with the defaulting ﬁrms or the time elapsed since their defaults. This makes it less important
that historical equity return correlations are only noisy proxies for asset correlations.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables used. The table
reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics of defaulted ﬁrms and those of all other
ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, in the quarter prior to default, defaulted ﬁrms are less proﬁtable, more leveraged,
with worse liquidity; they are also characterized by lower trailing excess equity returns and market-to-book-
ratios. In contrast, the characteristics of acquired ﬁrms are relatively similar to those in the whole sample,
with average proﬁts, liquidity levels, etc. that are roughly 80% of their whole sample analogues.
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we investigate the determinants of default and merger hazards. As a precursor to our full
analysis, we ﬁrst estimate a benchmark model that has no contagious or non-linear eﬀects. We then estimate
the semi-parametric model speciﬁed in Section 1.3.2 and compare the results. The in-sample performances
of the models are evaluated using McFadden's pseudo-R2 4 and likelihood ratio tests. Section 1.6 compares
the models' discriminatory power using out-of-sample Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) and its
summary statistic analogue, Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC).
1.5.1 Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model, the logarithm of the cause-speciﬁc hazard function λji (t) = exp{ηji (t)} is only
linearly related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic covariates zi:
ηji (t) = g
j
0(t) + z
′
iβ
j . (1.14)
4McFadden's pseudo R2 McFadden (1974) is given by 1−L1/L0 where L0 is the log-likelihood value for a model with only
an intercept and no variables included. L1 is the log-likelihood value for the full model.
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As in the model speciﬁed in equation (1.7), gj0(t) = log{hj0(t)} represents the log-baseline hazard, which is
speciﬁed by an unknown smooth function and estimated using penalized B-splines. Figure 1.2 shows the
baseline hazards for the benchmark model. The baseline hazard for corporate default exhibits signiﬁcant
time dependence, and is noticeably higher 1990, 2000, and 2007 than in other years. The baseline hazard
for mergers and acquisitions exhibits a wave-like pattern with peaks in 1999 and 2008, and troughs in 1992
and 2003. These ﬁndings indicate that, as Duﬃe et al. (2009) emphasize, it is important to account for
unobservable common macroeconomic shocks in the estimation of the hazards.
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Figure 1.2: Baseline Hazards for the Benchmark Model
Table 1.2: Competing Risks Model without Nonlinear and Contagion Eﬀects
This table reports results from competing risks model without nonlinear and contagion eﬀect. Asterisks denote
statistical signiﬁcant at the 1% (***) , 5% (**) , and 10% (*) levels.
Default Merger
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
ROA -9.7370 <0.0001 *** 1.6896 0.2355
Income Growth -3.3967 0.2286 3.6252 0.2609
Sales Growth 0.0043 0.9895 -0.8241 0.0059 ***
Total Liabilities / Total Assets 3.4294 <0.0001 *** 0.5657 0.0016 ***
Cash / Total Assets 0.5090 0.4388 1.2198 0.0004 ***
Working Capital / Total Assets -1.9784 <0.0001 *** -0.7412 0.0038 ***
Distance to Default -0.5934 <0.0001 *** -0.0123 0.3570
Log (Excess Equity Return) -1.8107 <0.0001 *** 0.1709 0.2390
Market-to-Book Ratio -1.7603 <0.0001 *** -0.2090 <0.0001 ***
Age of Firm (days) 0.0655 0.2307 -0.0989 0.0032 ***
Log (Total Assets/CPI ) 0.0187 0.6419 -0.0085 0.7487
Log (S&P500 Return) 0.8342 0.1989 -0.2440 0.6241
3-month Treasury Rate -1.6213 <0.0001 *** 0.0236 0.7421
Corporate Bond Yield Spreads 0.5470 0.0067 *** 0.2262 0.1055
Pseudo-R2 18.10%
Log likelihood -1574
Table 1.2 reports the estimated linear coeﬃcients for the benchmark model. Column 1 reveals that all
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three market-based covariates, distance to default, log excess equity return, and market-to-book ratio have
expected statistically signiﬁcant negative impacts on default hazards. Several accounting-based covariates
also enter signiﬁcantly with the expected signs. In particular, the proﬁtability measure, ROA, and the liquid-
ity measure, working capital/tatal assets, signiﬁcantly reduce default hazards; while the leverage measure,
total liability/tatal assets, signiﬁcantly raises default hazards. In addition, the benchmark model reports
signiﬁcant eﬀects of macroeconomic factors. Default hazards are lower when the spread between Aaa and
Baa corporate bond yields are greater, and, consistent with Duﬃe et al. (2007, 2009), the model shows a
negative dependence of default hazards on 3-month treasury rate.
Table 1.2, column 2, presents the results for the merger hazard. Several covariates aﬀect the merger and
default hazards in similar ways. In particular, ﬁrms with higher leverage, total liability/tatal assets, less
liquidity, working capital/tatal assets, and lower market-to-book ratios are more likely to be acquired. These
results indicate that ﬁrms with higher default hazards may seek a merger as an alternative to default. In
addition, ceteris paribus, merger hazards decrease in sales growth and age of ﬁrms.
Table 1.3: Hazard Ratios for a 1-Standard-Deviation Increase in Firm-Speciﬁc Covariates
Default Merger
Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
ROA 0.7533 *** 1.0504
Income Growth 0.9650 1.0388
Sales Growth 1.0006 0.8933 ***
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 2.1954 *** 1.1385 ***
Cash/Total Assets 1.0753 1.1900 ***
Working Capital / Total Assets 0.6886 *** 0.8695 ***
Distance to Default 0.0995 *** 0.9533
Log (Excess Equity Return) 0.6487 *** 1.0417
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.1254 *** 0.7815 ***
Log (Total Assets/CPI ) 1.0308 0.9863
Hazard ratio is equal to one, if the covariate does not have an impact on
ﬁrms' default or merger hazards. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcant at
the 1% (***) , 5% (**) , and 10% (*) levels.
The coeﬃcients in Table 1.2 represent the change in log hazard ratio associated with a one-unit change
in the covariate. However, to understand the relative importance of each covariate in determining default
and merger hazards, we calculate the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in a given covariate on the
hazard ratio. Table 1.3 shows that, consistent with previous literature (e.g., Hillegeist et al., 2004; Duﬃe
et al., 2007, 2009, etc), distance to default has by far the greatest impact on a ﬁrm's default hazard, followed
by market-to-book ratio, total liability/tatal assets, log excess equity return, working capital/tatal assets, and
ROA. For merger hazards, the most important covariate is market-to-book ratio.
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1.5.2 Semi-parametric Model with Non-linear and Contagion Eﬀects
Contagion Eﬀects
Turning to our full semi-parametric model, we see that the estimated contagion eﬀects are highly statistically
signiﬁcant for both default and merger hazards (p-value < 0.001), providing clear evidence of the importance
of intra-industry default and merger contagion. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate the estimated contagion eﬀects
among defaults and mergers, which are displayed through plots of the log hazard ratios against days after
default/merger and correlation of stock returns. We show each estimated contagion eﬀect in two ways.
The panels on the left illustrate the estimated contagion eﬀect using a colored contour plot where the log
hazard ratios for varying values of days after default/merger and correlation of stock returns are displayed
in diﬀerent colors, ranging from blue (low hazard) to pink (high hazard). The panels on the right presents
this information in a diﬀerent way, illustrating the estimated contagion eﬀects using a bivariate surface plot.
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Figure 1.3: Contagious eﬀects of defaults. Contour plot (left) and perspective plot (right).
As Figure 1.3 shows, the impact of one ﬁrm's default on the default hazard of anther ﬁrm in the same
industry monotonically increases with the correlation in their stock returns: the estimated contagion eﬀect
is especially strong when the ﬁrms' trailing stock returns are highly positively correlated, while the eﬀect is
attenuated when ﬁrms' returns are negative correlated. Moreover, the contagion eﬀect is not just contem-
poraneous. In fact, the impact of default by one ﬁrm on another ﬁrm's likelihood of default rises for several
months after default, before gradually decaying. For example, for ﬁrms with correlation of stock returns
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equal to 0.5, such impact peaks around day 90 and raises the default hazard of the other ﬁrm by about 28
percent. This ﬁnding illustrates how our approach captures both simultaneous and delayed default depen-
dency. The contagion eﬀect among mergers, illustrated in Figure 1.4, demonstrates a similar time-decay
pattern. However, the connectedness of ﬁrms, as captured by the correlation of their stock returns does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the level of contagion for mergers. This may reﬂect that merged ﬁrms continue to operate
in some form, while defaulting ﬁrms do not.
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Figure 1.4: Contagious eﬀects of mergers. Contour plot (left) and perspective plot (right).
Covariate Eﬀects
Figures 1.5 - 1.9 show the estimated covariate eﬀects together with 95% conﬁdence intervals. In the ﬁgures,
a covariate eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant when at least the 95% conﬁdence intervals do not fully cover the
zero line on log hazard ratio. To be identiﬁable, covariate eﬀects are subject to sum-to-zero identiﬁability
constraints: each smooth term should sum to zero over its covariate values. That means all the covariate
eﬀects are automatically centered and if a covariate eﬀect is estimated to be a straight line (a linear covariate
eﬀect) then the conﬁdence intervals vanish at the zero point. The covariate eﬀects are estimated using
penalized B-splines with smoothing parameters controlling the tradeoﬀ between overﬁtting and smoothness.
That means, in our semi-parametric model, as the smoothing parameter increases, the estimated covariate
eﬀect would be penalized towards a straight line (See Appendix B and C for details concerning the estimation
of the smoothing parameters.).
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Proﬁtability and Growth
Figure 1.5 shows the estimated impacts of a ﬁrm's proﬁtability and growth measures on its default and
merger hazards. The upper left panel shows that the proﬁtability measure ROA has a large and seemingly
non-linear impact on a ﬁrm's default hazard. More speciﬁcally, for ROA below 0.01, default hazards decrease
sharply with increases in ROA. For example, the default hazard of a ﬁrm with an ROA of -0.04 is roughly
e1.1, which is approximately three times larger than that for a ﬁrm with an ROA of 0.01. In contrast, for
very proﬁtable ﬁrms, ROA ceases to have statistically signiﬁcant impact. The economic intuition behind
the documented non-linear eﬀect of a ﬁrm's ROA on its default hazard is sharp. While higher proﬁtability
always reduces a ﬁrm's risk of default on its debt payments, its marginal eﬀect is tiny for very proﬁtable
ﬁrms. The lower left panel reveals that ROA has no signiﬁcant impact on a ﬁrm's merger hazard for ﬁrms
with ROAs below the 95th quantile of the sample. However, increases in ROA for highly proﬁtable ﬁrms
with ROAs above the 95th quantile of the sample raise the probability that they are targets for merger by
87 percent for a ﬁrm at the 99th quantile versus one at the 95th quantilethe opposite pattern from that
with default.
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(a) Covariate eﬀects on default hazard
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(b) Covariate eﬀects on merger hazard
Figure 1.5: Covariate eﬀects of ﬁrm proﬁtability and growth. The shaded areas are 95% conﬁdence inter-
vals. The vertical dashed lines in the graphs correspond to the 5th, 50th, and 95th sample quantiles of
the covariates. The boundaries of the graphs correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th sample quantiles of the
covariates.
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The upper center panel in Figure 1.5 also shows a seeming slightly non-monotonic relationship between
sales growth and a ﬁrm's default hazard. In particular, high sales growth rates are associated with moderately
higher default risks (48 percent increase from median to 95th percentile). This conceivably reﬂects that high
sales growth ﬁrms may have funded that growth with more debt. Default risks are also marginally higher by
about 14 percent relative to median sales growth rates for ﬁrms at the ﬁfth percentile of (negative) growth
rates, consistent with default of poorly-performing ﬁrms. In contrast, sales growth has a negative statistically
signiﬁcant linear impact on mergers, consistent with earlier ﬁndings in the literature (Palepu, 1986) that
acquired targets are typically low-growth ﬁrms (compare median and 95th percentile). The right panels
show that, as in the benchmark model, net income growth has no signiﬁcant impact on a ﬁrm's default or
merger hazard.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
−
2
0
2
4
Total Liabilities / Total Assets
Lo
g 
Ha
za
rd
 R
at
io
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
Cash / Total Assets
Lo
g 
Ha
za
rd
 R
at
io
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Working Capital / Total Assets
Lo
g 
Ha
za
rd
 R
at
io
(a) Covariate eﬀects on default hazard
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(b) Covariate eﬀects on merger hazard
Figure 1.6: Covariate eﬀects of leverage and liquidity measures on default hazard and merger hazard. The
shaded areas are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical dashed lines in the graphs correspond to the 5th,
50th, and 95th sample quantiles of the covariates. The boundaries of the graphs correspond to the 2.5th
and 97.5th sample quantiles of the covariates.
Leverage and Liquidity
Figure 1.6 illustrates the estimated eﬀects of a ﬁrm's leverage and liquidity measures on its default and
merger hazards. The graphs show that total liabilities/total assets and working capital/total assets have
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monotonic impacts on the hazards, but that the marginal impacts are tiny for ﬁrms in good shape with low
total liabilities or even modest working capital. That is, leverage and liquidity exhibit distinct threshold
eﬀects on hazards. The upper left panel shows that the impact of a ﬁrm's leverage ratio on its default hazard
is weak for total liabilities/total assets below the median level of 0.6. However, default risks rise massively
by a factor of roughly 7 as total liabilities/total assets go from the median level of 0.6 to the 95th percentile
of 1. The observed threshold eﬀect highlightss that a same-size debt reduction has a far greater impact on
a ﬁrm's default risk when the ﬁrm is close to insolvency. Relatedly, the upper center panel reveals that the
marginal beneﬁt of increased working capital is large for ﬁrms with lower liquidity (the default risk for a ﬁrm
at the 5th percentile of working capital is 1.63 times that of a ﬁrm with a median level of working capital),
and the marginal impact of additional working capital is nil for ﬁrms with liquidity levels above the median.
Interestingly, cash holdings do not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on default hazards.
The ﬁgures reveal that for merger hazards, consistent with the benchmark model's ﬁndings, ﬁrms in
poorer ﬁnancial health, as captured by the levels of total liabilities/total assets, and working capital/total
assets, are more likely to be merger targets, and that these statistically signiﬁcant impacts are linear in
nature, albeit small relative to their impacts on default risks. For example, going from the 5th to 95th
percentiles of total liabilities raises the likelihood of merger by 40 percent. That is, ﬁrms with higher debt
burdens and lower liquidity levels are more likely to become acquisition targets, consistent the premise that
ﬁnancially-distressed ﬁrms use mergers as a means of avoiding liquidation. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms' cash
holdings, measured by cash/total assets, are positively correlated with their likelihood of being acquired.
This result is consistent with Jensen's (1986) `agency cost of free cash ﬂow theory of takeovers': ﬁrms with
ineﬃcient management teams that refuse to pay free cash ﬂows out to shareholders are likely takeover targets.
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(a) Covariate eﬀects on default hazard
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(b) Covariate eﬀects on merger hazard
Figure 1.7: Covariate eﬀects of market-based variables on default hazard and merger hazard. The shaded
areas are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical dashed lines in the graphs correspond to the 5th, 50th, and
95th sample quantiles of the covariates. The boundaries of the graphs correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th
sample quantiles of the covariates.
Market-Based Variables
Figure 1.7 shows the estimated eﬀects of the market-based variables. The ﬁgure reveals that the likelihood
of default is very sensitive to the distance to default for ﬁrms close to default, lower by a factor of 11 for
a ﬁnancially-insolvent ﬁrm at the 5th percentile of the distance to default relative to a ﬁrm at the median
distance to default. As indicated by the wide conﬁdence band, the estimated eﬀects of the distance to default
on default hazard are less signiﬁcant for a ﬁnancially-healthy ﬁrm. Firms with lower than median log excess
equity return are also more likely to default, especially those with very low excess returns, consistent with
the ﬁndings of Shumway (2001) and Duﬃe et al. (2007): while distance to default has by far the largest,
most negative impact on default hazards, a ﬁrm's trailing stock return provides signiﬁcant incremental
information on predicting its default risk. We also see a clear threshold relationship between market-to-book
ratio and ﬁrms default hazards. Default risks sharply decline by a factor of 13 as market-to-book ratio
increases from the 5th percentile to the median, and are then stable market-to-book ratios exceeding the
median of 1.5. Market-to-book ratio may be a mixed measure for the default risk (Fama and French, 1996)
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and future growth opportunities (Myers, 1977), and these results suggest that the default risks drive its
observed threshold eﬀects.
Interestingly, distance to default has no signiﬁcant impact on merger hazardsmerger risks seem to be
captured by the overall measures of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial health (liabilities, working capital, cash, sales), rather
than the measured proximity to default, per se. We also see small positive estimated eﬀects of log(excess
equity return) for ﬁrms with recent share appreciation, and a small negative estimated impact of market-to-
book ratio. These ﬁndings are consiste with the premise that ﬁrms with disappointing levels of share prices
(e.g., due to bad management) are targets for takeover (see Powell (1997) and Dong et al. (2006)), and that
the market anticipates that the ﬁrms may be merger targets, at prices that are at premiums relative to
the current share price. This could be anticipation of a takeover, or it may be that the the stock price of
the acquisition target might be driven up by the information leakage before merger or the intention of the
acquirer ﬁrm to build up a stake in the target ﬁrm.
Other Firm Speciﬁc Variables
In line with Shumway (2001), we ﬁnd that ﬁrm age is not systemically correlated with the default hazard.
However, our results show a signiﬁcant negative relation between ﬁrm age and the likelihood of being
acquired. This likely reﬂects that younger ﬁrms are typically smaller and more ﬁnancially constrained with
higher growth rates, and hence more attractive takoever targets. Figure 1.8 also shows that the ﬁrm's
size, measured by log(total assets/CPI ), is positively correlated with default risks for small ﬁrms. This
counterintuitive relationship between a ﬁrm's size and default risk is likely due to the non-trivial survivorship
bias in the Compustat database for small ﬁrms.5 On the other hand, the eﬀect of the ﬁrm's size on merger
hazard is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5Compustat does not include recently listed small-sized ﬁrms. If such small ﬁrms only survive for one or two years before
defaulting they do not enter the database; however, Compustat may backﬁll prior ﬁnancial statements for small ﬁrms that
survive.
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(a) Covariate eﬀects on default hazard
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(b) Covariate eﬀects on merger hazard
Figure 1.8: Covariate eﬀects of ﬁrm's age and size on default hazard and merger hazard. The shaded areas
are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical dashed lines in the graphs correspond to the 5th, 50th, and 95th
sample quantiles of the covariates. The boundaries of the graphs correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th sample
quantiles of the covariates.
Baseline Hazards and Macroeconomic Covariates
Figure 1.9 illustrates the estimated eﬀects of macroeconomic covariates. The 3-month treasury bill rates
exhibit strong negative impacts on both ﬁrms' default and merger hazards. Duﬃe et al. (2007) argue that
this negative correlation is caused by the fact that the US Federal Reserve typically increases short-term
interest rates to `cool down' business expansions and lowers them to stimulate economic growth during
recessions. The estimated eﬀects of these macroeconomic covariates should be interpreted cautiously: As in
most previous research, we introduce macroeconomic factors simply as contemporaneous variables, and to
the extent that these factors measure overall macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, their impacts may appear with a
time lag.6
6Koopman and Lucas (2005) show how estimation results may be sensitive to the choice of lag length.
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(b) Covariate eﬀects for merger
Figure 1.9: Covariate eﬀects of macroeconomic conditions on default hazard and merger hazard. The shaded
areas are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical dashed lines in the graphs correspond to the 5th, 50th, and
95th sample quantiles of the covariates. The boundaries of the graphs correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th
sample quantiles of the covariates.
Lastly, Figure 1.10 shows that the estimated baseline hazards in our semi-parametric model, are very
similar to those in the benchmark model (Figure 1.2). These results imply that unobservable common
macroeconomic risk factors continue to play important roles in explaining default and merger outcomes even
after accounting for intra-industry contagion and non-linear impacts of observable risk factors.
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Figure 1.10: Baseline Hazards for the Semi-parametric Model
To summarize, our results show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates exhibit threshold and non-monotonic impacts
on corporate default/merger intensities. Several ﬁnancial ratios only signiﬁcant aﬀect a ﬁrm's default or
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merger hazard when they are above or below some critical levels. These threshold eﬀects have strong
economic interpretationsthe marginal impacts of these ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables only matter substantially for
default when the levels of these variable indicate that the ﬁrm is in poor ﬁnancial health. Models that ignore
such non-linear eﬀects will overestimate the impacts of the variables on some ranges while underestimating
them on other ranges.
To emphasizes the importance of accounting for these nonlinear and contagion eﬀects we compare the
ﬁt of the benchmark model from the literature with our semi-parametric model. The pseudo-R2 improves
remarkably from 18.10% for the benchmark model to 28.80% for our semi-parametric model. The likelihood
ratio test statistic, −2log L(benchmark)L(semi−parametric) is 478.05, with a p-value that is less than 0.0001. These statistics
indicate that our semi-parametric model speciﬁcation far better describes default and merger risks than the
standard benchmark model. Simply put, accounting for the non-linear eﬀects of covariates and contagion
eﬀects for default and merger risks matters.
1.6 Out-of-Sample Performance
In this section, we document that our semi-parametric model delivers a far superior forecast accuracy to
the benchmark linear model. To do this, ﬁrst randomly select 75% of our sample ﬁrms to estimate the
parameters of the benchmark and semi-parametric models. We then use these parameter estimates to
forecast the default and merger probabilities of the remaining 25% ﬁrms. We then compute the out-of-
sample Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and its summary statistic analogue Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC). A cuto-oﬀ value C provides a decision rule that divides debtors
into defaulters and non-defaulters: A debtor is classiﬁed as a defaulter if and only iﬁts core is lower than C.
The ROC curve graphs correctly vs. incorrectly-predicted defaults for all cutoﬀs C. The Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic summarizes the information in the ROC curve in a single statistic that
takes on values between 0 and 1, where a random model with no predictive power delivers an AUROC of
0.5 and a perfect model has an AUROC of 1. The ROC curve and AUROC are popular tools for assessing
default risk models (see Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004, etc.). See Appendix C for more
details.
Figure 1.11 presents the ROC curves of default for both models. The ﬁgure reveals that the semi-
parametric model tremendously outperforms the benchmark model in terms of out-of-sample forecast accu-
racy, stochastically dominating it at all cutoﬀ levels, and performing especially well for intermediate cutoﬀ
levels, where substantial fractions of ﬁrms are classiﬁed both to default and to non-default. The out-of-sample
27
AUROC statistic, which is a summary measure of this superior ﬁt improves from 0.9176 to an astonishing
0.9778.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Out−sample ROC curve for default
1 − Specificity
Se
ns
itiv
ity
Model I AUROC out of sample = 0.9176
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Se
ns
itiv
ity
Model II AUROC out of sample = 0.9778
Figure 1.11: Out-sample ROC curves: Default. Model I is the benchmark model without non-linear and
contagion eﬀects and model II is our semi-parametric competing risks model.
Figure 1.12 shows the ROC curves for mergers for both models. Our semi-parametric model (AUROC
= 0.6260) still dominates the benchmark model (AUROC = 0.6095). However, both models do a poor job of
predicting a ﬁrm's acquisition probability. This relatively poor performance may reﬂect that our covariates
are largely derived from the default and bankruptcy forecasting literature, and that covariates that accurately
predict corporate defaults matter far less for mergers. Also, ﬁrms are acquired for diﬀerent reasons. Both
fast-growing and distressed ﬁrms are likely targets for acquisition. Given the sharply diﬀerent motives for
acquisitions, a ﬁrm's characteristics could exhibit diﬀerent, even opposing impacts on its probability of being
acquired. To explore this possibility, we investigate the interaction eﬀects of distance to default, which proxies
a ﬁrm's distress status with the other two most signiﬁcant ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates, market-to-book ratio and
working capital/total assets. Figure 1.13 indicates that the eﬀects of both market-to-book ratio and working
capital/total assets on hazard vary with distance to default. In particular, the eﬀects of market-to-book ratio
are most signiﬁcant when ﬁrms are far from insolvency while working capital/total assets exhibits opposite
impacts on merger probabilities of ﬁrms with extreme small or large distances to default. Since our interest
is mainly on forecasting defaults, we do not exhaust all possible combinations of covariates. Rather, we
only point out potential mis-speciﬁcations in modeling ﬁrms' merger hazards and leave this matter to future
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research.
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Figure 1.12: Out-sample ROC curves: Merger. Model I is the benchmark model without non-linear and
contagion eﬀects and model II is our semi-parametric competing risks model.
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Figure 1.13: Interactions. Perspective plots for interactions between distance to default and market-to-book
ratio (left) and for interactions between distance to default and working capital/total assets (right)
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1.7 Conclusions
We develop a semi-parametric hazard model that incorporated contagious defaults, potential non-linear
impacts of covariate, and competing risk events (mergers and acquisitions) to estimate corporate default
intensities. We ﬂexibly model default correlations among ﬁrms using two-dimensional penalized tensor-
product splines, and treat dropouts due to mergers and acquisitions as competing risks to defaults. We
quantify the direct impact of one ﬁrm's default on default intensities of other ﬁrms using the ﬁnancial distance
between them, as captured by the 12-month trailing correlation in their equity returns, and allow the impact
of one ﬁrm's default on another's default hazard to have a delayed impact. Our semi-parametric hazard
model subsumes the benchmark dynamic `frailty' model proposed by Duﬃe et al. (2009) as a special case if
we remove the contagion component and non-linear covariate eﬀects, and adopt the Bayesian perspective of
treating the deterministic time eﬀects as stochastic eﬀects with a pre-speciﬁed prior.
We estimate our model using data on U.S. public ﬁrms during 1990-2010, using an unusually broad set of
observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic default risk factors. We provide overwhelming evidence of the
importance of accounting for both intra-industry contagion in default and mergers, and for the non-linear
impacts of risk factors. We show that the contagious impact of default takes time to cumulate, reaching a
peak after about 90-120 days, before slowly declining. Contagion eﬀects especially raise the default risks
of closely (positively) linked ﬁrms thereby giving rise to the correlated defaults seen in the data, although
we also provide evidence of competitive eﬀects of default on ﬁrms with negative linkages. Merger hazards
display a similar time decay pattern, but the contagious impact is insensitive to the correlation between
ﬁrms, indicating that merged ﬁrms continue to have a presence in the industry, leaving competitive forces
and contractual linkages less aﬀected.
We also provide evidence that many ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables have highly non-linear impacts
on default risks: many only exhibit signiﬁcant impacts on default once they are above or below some
critical level. These threshold eﬀects reﬂect that only relatively unhealthy ﬁrms are potential candidates for
default, so that measures of ﬁrm proﬁtability and viability only begin to matter for default risk when their
magnitudes indicate that the ﬁrm is unhealthy. So, too, we ﬁnd that many risk factors enter the hazard into
merger/acquisition non-linearly.
The likelihood ratio statistic of 478 (p-value < 0.0001) for our full semi-parametric hazard model versus
our benchmark model analogue to Duﬃe et al. (2009) emphasizes the importance of accounting for both
contagion and for the intuitive non-linear impacts of many risk factors in estimating default hazards. We
then perform out-of-sample tests using 75% of the sample to estimate the models, and then predicting the
probability of defaults for the other 25%. Our full semi-parametric hazard model does a vastly better job
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than the benchmark model at forecasting out-of-sample default probabilities.
These ﬁndings help us understand the true mechanisms driving the observed clustering in defaults and
mergers and acquisitions. Not only do common observable and unobservable macroeconomic risk factors
aﬀect default intensities, but so do the various linkages, strategic, ﬁnancial, contractual, etc., between ﬁrms.
Via these linkages, default by one ﬁrm can sharply alter the default probabilities of other ﬁrms.
Methodologically, our semi-parametric hazard model can usefully be adopted to other settings in which
it is important to accommodate both the contagious eﬀects of risk factors (and their evolving cumulative
temporal impacts), and the non-linear impacts of covariates. For example, our approach can be used to
model consumer decisions to reﬁnance mortgages or to default on mortgages.
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Chapter 2
Hazardous Analysts: Reputation
Management and the Duration of
Recommendations
2.1 Introduction
Financial analysts play a key role as information intermediaries in the capital market. Analysts gather and
evaluate information from public and private sources, write research reports, produce corporate earnings
forecasts, and make recommendations that lead to the buying or selling of a company's securities. Among
ﬁnancial analysts' outputs, stock recommendations are the most direct and unequivocal way for analysts to
express opinions about likely future stock returns.
Ideally, recommendations should help investors by reducing informational asymmetries, allowing investors
to more accurately value companies and thereby proﬁt from trading. Indeed, the short-term price and volume
impacts of revisions in analysts' recommendations reveal that they inﬂuence investment decisions of both
institutional and retail investors. In turn, researchers have shown that, on average, such investor responses
are well-founded: for example, Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001) uncover evidence that the cross-
section of recommendations has forecasting power for future returns, while Jegadeesh et al. (2004) documents
the proﬁtability and informativeness of consensus recommendation levels and consensus recommendation
changes.
This research highlights benevolent sides of analysts. Other research highlights less benevolent aspects,
documenting how recommendations are inﬂuenced by factors other than analysts' assessments of value. For
instance, Lin and McNichols (1998) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show that sell-side analysts with investment
banking relationships tend to issue optimistic recommendations; O'Brien et al. (2005) ﬁnd that aﬃliated
analysts are slower (faster) to downgrade (upgrade) recommendations; Jackson (2005) and Cowen et al.
(2006) show that bullish recommendations generate more trades for brokerage houses because investors
face implicit or explicit short sale constraints; and Lim (2001) observes how incentives to curry favor with
management lead to upward biases.
Oﬀsetting these less benign incentives, analysts who provide timely and accurate recommendations and
forecasts generate additional trading business for their ﬁrms (Cowen et al., 2006; Jackson, 2005), and are
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rewarded for it with higher compensation and employment by larger brokerage houses (Hong and Kubik,
2003), while less accurate analysts are more likely to be ﬁred (Mikhail et al., 1999). Indeed, Ljungqvist et al.
(2007), using longitudinal data, ﬁnd that the presence of more institutional investors induces investment
banking aﬃliated analysts to dampen overly-enthusiastic recommendations, suggesting that career concerns
and reputation management alleviate bias. So too, Fang and Yasuda (2009) argue that reputation concerns
of analysts should ameliorate the consequences of adverse incentives for recommendations.
The contribution of our paper is to provide a rigorous analysis of how time-varying reputation manage-
ment incentives aﬀect ﬁnancial analyst's recommendations. As reputation is analyst speciﬁc, the proper
analysis is at the individual analyst level. Moreover, the econometric analysis must account for the fact that
the reputation consequences of an outstanding recommendation ﬂuctuate as time passes and a stock does
well or does poorly, and as information arrives about earnings and the recommendations of other analysts.
Accordingly, we develop a semiparametric competing risks hazard model that accommodates both unob-
served heterogeneity and the time-varying eﬀects of covariates on analysts' recommendations to uncover
the determinants of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions. Our model focuses on the cause-speciﬁc
hazard (intensity) of an analyst's recommendation revision, i.e., the probability of making a particular type
of recommendation revision, for example, a downgrade from strong buy to sell, conditional on the analyst
not having changed her previous recommendation over the preceding period t of time.
Ideally, analysts would be forward looking, and a recommendation's past performance would only in-
ﬂuence revisions to the extent that it predicts future returns. However, we ﬁnd that analysts keep past
good recommendations for too long, and drop past bad recommendations too quickly. For example, analysts
are far more likely to downgrade a recommendation when the return since a recommendation was issued
was negative; and to preserve a strong buy recommendation when the return was high. That is, incen-
tives to maintain a `good' reputationa good-looking recommendation list in front of customersappear
to aggravate rather than alleviate conﬂicts of interest.
Beyond the heightened sensitivity of revisions to past poor performance, we also document that the
information content about future returns associated with recommendation revisions depends on the recom-
mendation's past performance. We are particularly interested in addressing: how does a recommendation's
past performance inﬂuence the sensitivity of recommendations to future returns? Overall, analysts appear
prescient: downgrades (upgrades) are more likely when future returns are bad (good). However, this overall
assessment masks the dependence on past performance. In particular, the past poor performance of a rec-
ommendation, e.g., past very negative returns following a strong buy, dramatically reduce the sensitivity of
recommendations to future returns. Thus, if since a strong buy or buy recommendation was issued, returns
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were highly negative, then downgrades are very likely, independently of whether future returns are low or
high. In contrast, when past returns were higher, the likelihood of a recommendation revision becomes
sensitive to future returns, implying that an analyst's recommendation decision (maintaining a strong buy
versus a downgrade) contains more information about future returns when past returns have been higher. In
sum, our analysis both sheds light on what causes analysts to revise their recommendations, and it allows us
to assess how the informativeness and objectiveness of a particular recommendation depends on the analyst-
and stock-speciﬁc context in which it was made.
Our ﬁndings suggest that some investors sporadically monitor (or forget) analyst recommendations, so
analysts have incentives to preserve past good performing recommendations in front of customers and to
expunge poorly performing ones: maintaining a handsome recommendation list helps analysts convince their
audiences of their abilities and build successful careers. At one level, this is not surprising: in the media,
one is bombarded with advertisements from ﬁnancial analysts that remind investors of their greatest stock
picks, while omitting mention of bad picks. Consistent with this, Ljungqvist et al. (2009) document that
analysts modify appearances when it is costless: their research uncovers widespread and systematic ex post
changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S analyst stock recommendations database that serve to
falsify past recommendations to make them appear better than they truly were. In eﬀect, we show that
reputation management incentives also cause analysts to make recommendations that would be costly for
their customers if followed.
Our paper also contributes methodologically. Most of the literature uses a portfolio approach to analyze
the impact of the level and/or change in the consensus recommendation: such studies implicitly treat
recommendations issued by diﬀerent analysts at diﬀerent points in time with varying incentives as if they all
contain identical investment value. In contrast, our individual-speciﬁc hazard analysis explicitly incorporates
the fact that reputation is analyst speciﬁc.
Second, in contrast to singleperiod classiﬁcation (e.g., probit) models, our hazard model accounts for
the duration dependence in recommendation revisions. To understand the necessity of doing this, consider
the reputation management incentives of an analyst who issues a strong buy recommendation based on
research that indicates that a biotech company has a drug that will eventually be approved by the FDA,
but is heavily undervalued by the market. Eventually, his assessment will be correct and the return high.
However, the FDA may take an unexpectedly long time to evaluate the drug, and the biotech's share
price may fall. Because analysts are evaluated on a recommendation's short-term performance, as time
goes by, the recommendation's temporarily poor performance places pressure on the analyst to give up his
original `correct' recommendation and to revise his recommendation downward, or to drop it completely.
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This example illustrates why the econometric model must capture the time-varying impacts of reputational
concerns on the likelihood of revisions.
Even this description omits several salient considerations. Reﬂection reveals that allowing for the non-
linear impacts of covariates is important. For example, analysts may be insensitive to small performance
changes since a recommendation was issueda reluctance to revise too frequently could lead to stickiness
in recommendations when price changes are slight. If so, the performance of outstanding recommendations
would have nonlinear eﬀects on the likelihood of revisions, ﬂat around the reference value, and steep (pos-
sibly asymmetrically so) when price changes are large. In addition, the nature of what cumulative return
constitutes good or bad performance of a recommendation depends on how long a recommendation has
been outstandingfor a strong buy recommendation, a 5% return over one week would be great, but a 5%
return over a year would notand the consequences for the likelihood of recommendation revisions will vary
accordingly.
One could accommodate this non-linear, time-varying impact of cumulative returns by applying nonlinear
transformations or piecewise linear functions to cumulative returns and use interaction terms between cumu-
lative returns and time dummies. Such approaches have the virtue of being computationally undemanding,
but have signiﬁcant drawbacks: functional forms must be predetermined, and may be mis-speciﬁed; and with
piecewise linear functions of cumulative returns and time, one must choose both the number and location of
boundaries (knots) in advance, discretize continuous variables and allow the eﬀects of covariates to jump at
the boundaries.
To circumvent these concerns, we adopt the recently-developed hazard model of Kneib and Fahrmeir
(2006). The model incorporates a time-varying baseline hazard, models the nonlinear covariate eﬀects using
penalized splines, and models the time-varying eﬀects using two dimensional tensor product penalized splines
of time and covariates with an automatic smoothing parameter selection.1 This approach allows cumulative
returns and other covariates to exert time-varying nonlinear impacts on analyst decision-making: our model
can capture the dynamics of analysts' actions and detect the pattern of eﬀects that are actually driven by
data.
We ﬁnd that each of these features of our econometric model matters. First, we uncover signiﬁcant
time variation in the baseline hazard: analysts are more likely to revise recent recommendations, but as
time passes, they are less likely to change recommendations, suggesting that their attention wanes. Second,
the impact of covariates is sensitive to the time passed since a recommendation was issued. For example,
initially both very poor and very good past performance raise the hazards of downward revisions, but once
1We also introduce random eﬀects to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity that appears in hazard models and longitudinal
data analysis due to the econometrician's limited information set.
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recommendation durations exceed ten months, cumulative returns only have monotonic negative eﬀects on
the hazards of downgrades. So, too, as information about ﬁrms and analysts arrives over time, the impact on
the likelihood of revision changes. In particular, time relative to the earnings announcement date matters:
earnings surprises lead to recommendation changes only in the ﬁrst two weeks after earnings are reported.
These ﬁndings highlight why single-period classiﬁcation models, which treat recommendation revisions as
if they only depend on the current period information, would fail to deliver the correct probabilities of
recommendation revisions.
We also provide an exhaustive analysis of how the speciﬁc characteristics of the analyst (e.g., experience
and reputation), brokerage house (e.g., specialization or investment banking relationship) or stock followed
(e.g., age, size, return volatility, accounting measures, analyst following) aﬀect recommendation decisions.
We uncover non-linear impacts of covariates in forms that researchers could not possibly have anticipated.
For example, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of revisions falls sharply with experience in an analyst's ﬁrst three
years (the odds of a revision in an analyst's ﬁrst year are roughly three times that of an analyst with three
years experience), but then plateaus for many years, before declining further for very experienced analysts.
Many of these variables have signiﬁcant impacts on the likelihood of analyst recommendation revisions. For
example, increases in accruals sharply raise the likelihood of downgrades, while recommendations for stocks
with higher institutional holdings are more likely to be revised upward.
Finally, to evaluate a recommendation from the perspective of an investor, we use market-adjusted
cumulative abnormal returns over the future 120 trading days to measure a recommendation's proﬁtability.
We treat future cumulative abnormal returns as a covariate to test whether the downgrades (upgrades) are
proﬁtable by examining whether, controlling for other covariates, future cumulative abnormal returns have
signiﬁcant negative (positive) eﬀects on the hazards of analysts' recommendation revisions. Our results show
that relative to similar stock recommendations that do not experience revisions, recommendation revisions
generally contain investment value: the hazards of downgrading from strong buy or buy recommendations
increase as cumulative future abnormal returns fall, while the hazards of upgrading from hold and buy
recommendations are increasing functions of future cumulative abnormal returns.
To assess how the past performance of outstanding recommendations aﬀect the proﬁtability of recom-
mendation revisions, we run two sets of tests. First, we analyze the eﬀects of future proﬁts on the hazards
of recommendation revisions conditional on the past performance of outstanding recommendations. In the
framework of our competing risks hazard model, we apply three-way tensor product penalized splines to
model the interaction eﬀects of the duration of the existing recommendation, past performance and future
proﬁts. This allows the eﬀects of future proﬁts on the hazards of recommendation revisions to vary with the
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past performance of outstanding recommendations. We then compare the proﬁtability of revised recommen-
dations with stock recommendations that do not experience revisions, but share similar past performance
and other characteristics. Second, for the sub-sample of revised recommendations, we analyze how the prof-
itability of a particular revision varies with time and past performance after controlling for market risk, size,
book-to-market eﬀects, etc. For example, we ﬁnd that if downgrades are driven by past poor performance,
then the proﬁt predictive ability of such recommendation revisions is impaired: for downgrades from strong
buy and buy, future abnormal returns surge as past cumulative returns fall.
In sum, our research makes several distinct contributions. Methodologically, we develop a new statistical
framework to analyze analyst recommendations that can accommodate nonlinear and time-varying eﬀects,
and unobserved heterogeneity in a uniﬁed framework. Our framework can also be applied to problems
such as credit rating dynamics, predicting mortgage terminations, or forecasting corporate bankruptcy. Our
empirical ﬁndings provide insights into how time-varying reputational concerns and the arrival of new infor-
mation aﬀect analyst recommendations. Our analysis reveals that to assess properly the quality of analyst
recommendations, one must account for broader potential conﬂicts of interests; and from the perspective of
investors, our study sheds light on the context-speciﬁc nature of information about future returns contained
in analyst recommendations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the details of our statistical model. Section
2.3 describes our data and discusses diﬀerent measures of determinants. Section 2.4 reports our empirical
ﬁndings. Section 2.5 provides some robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Econometric Model
In this section, we review key concepts of the discrete-time competing risks model, and deﬁne its statistical
components. We then present our model of analyst recommendation revisions. Finally, we discuss estimation
and inference approaches.
2.2.1 Competing Risks Model
A competing risks model is a model for multiple durations that start at the same point of time for a given
subject, where the subject is observed until the ﬁrst duration is completed and one also observes which of the
multiple durations is completed ﬁrst (van den Berg, 2005). Here, the relevant durations are the durations
of transitions between diﬀerent recommendation levels. The observable data consist of the time T and cause
J of termination, and a vector X of covariates, which we ignore for the moment. The object of focus is the
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cause-speciﬁc hazard function, i.e., the conditional probability of terminating with cause j at time t given
the presence of all other competing risks and not having failed from any cause until time t,
λj(t) = Pr [T = t, J = j | T ≥ t] . (2.1)
The cause-speciﬁc hazard λj(t) is estimable and constitutes all relevant information that can be observed
from the data. Without considering covariates, a simple estimator of λj(t) is
λ̂j(t) =
n of event j at time t
n of at risk at time t
.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the hazards of recommendation revisions decrease over time, while the hazards of
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Figure 2.1: The estimated cause speciﬁc hazard and cumulative incidence function without covariates. We
truncate the sample at 360 trading days, so that recommendations outstanding for more than 18 months are
treated as censored.
dropping coverage rise. Figure 2.1 provides information about the time dependency of recommendation
revisions. In particular, it suggests that analysts pay less and less attention over time to stocks whose rec-
ommendation has not changed. However, a full accounting must incorporate the covariates and correlations
among observations.
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The survival function is the probability of not having failed from any cause at time t:
S(t) =
∏
τ≤t
(
1−
J∑
j=1
λj(τ)
)
, (2.2)
while the unconditional probability of terminating from cause j at time t is
pj(t) = Prob(T = t, J = j) = λj(t)S(t− 1). (2.3)
Finally, the cumulative incidence function of cause j, Ij(t), is the probability Prob(T ≤ t, J = j) of termi-
nating from cause j before time t. We write Ij(t) in terms of the cause-speciﬁc hazards:
Ij(t) =
∑
τ≤t
pj(τ) =
∑
τ≤t
λj(τ)S(τ − 1). (2.4)
In our competing risks hazard model for analyst recommendations, the recommendation revision intensity
(hazard), λj(t), can depend on both observed and unobserved state variables, including market-wide and
stock characteristics, analyst and brokerage house attributes. Conditional on the current recommendation,
analysts have several options (competing risks) to leave the current state. For example, as Figure 2.2
illustrates, if the current recommendation is a `buy', an analyst can upgrade to strong buy, downgrade to
hold, sell, or strong sell, or drop coverage. The variables of interest are the hazards of downgrades, upgrades,
and dropping coverage conditional on the time elapsed since the last recommendation was issued.
BUY
λBuy,Strong Buy
λBuy, Sell
λBuy, Buy
λBuy, Hold
Strong Buy
BUY
Sell & Strong 
Sell
Hold
DROP
λBuy, Drop
Figure 2.2: The case where current recommendation is Buy and upgrading to Strong Buy, downgrading to Hold or
Sell & Strong Sell, and dropping coverage act as competing risks.
We group time into intervals of 20 trading days, partitioning time into d+ 1 intervals
[a0, a1), [a1, a2), · · · , [at−1, at) · · · , [ad−1, ad), [ad,∞),
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with the ﬁrst d intervals representing 20 trading days. We adopt this discrete-time approach for several
reasons. First, it allows the results to be interpreted in a similar way to those for the commonly-used logistic
regression approach. Second, even though recommendations are recorded in days, the large sample means
that there are many ties in which multiple recommendations were revised after exactly t days. This would
happen with probability zero in continuous time, but were we to estimate the standard Cox continuous-time
model in partial likelihood, it would lead to serious bias and require a method for resolving ties. Finally, when
we estimate the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), it is easier to handle time-varying covariates and
time-varying eﬀects by using interaction terms with time dummies. We group observations into 20 trading
day intervals because (i) many covariates such as earnings are updated infrequently (e.g., on a quarterly
basis) and were we to divide time more ﬁnely, there would be minimal incremental information in each
observation, and (ii) revisions are infrequent (the median time to revision exceeds 100 days), so with slight
variation in covariates, our estimates would be swamped by noise.
We use T ijksl = t, t = 1, · · · , d to denote that analyst k makes the lth recommendation revision from
recommendation level i to level j about stock s within the interval [at−1, at). Here {j : 0 ≤ j ≤ 5} denotes
the type of recommendation revision, where 0 ≡ no recommendation revision, 1 ≡ Strong Buy, 2 ≡ Buy,
3 ≡ Hold, 4 ≡ Sell & Strong Sell, and 5 ≡ stop recommendation.Since we analyze recommendation revisions
based on each outstanding recommendation i separately, we omit the index i on the existing recommendation
level when presenting the model.
Observed durations T jksl are assumed to be independent conditional on the observed covariates Xksl(t),
which include both current and lagged variables at time t, and unobserved frailty terms (random eﬀects)
ω. The cause-speciﬁc discrete hazard function, λjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω), is the conditional probability of making a
recommendation revision j within time interval t, given no revision prior to t,
λjksl(t|Xksl(t), ω) = Pr
[
T jksl = t, J = j | T jksl ≥ t,Xksl(t), ω
]
. (2.5)
The corresponding survival function, i.e., the probability of no revision by time t, is
Sksl(t|Xksl(t), ω) = Pr
[
T jksl ≥ t, | Xksl(t), ω
]
=
∏
τ≤t
1− J∑
j=1
λjksl(τ |Xksl(τ), ω)

= λ0ksl(1|Xksl(1), ω)× λ0ksl(2|Xksl(2), ω)× · · · × λ0ksl(t|Xksl(t), ω)
=
∏
τ≤t
λ0ksl(τ |Xksl(τ), ω), (2.6)
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where λ0ksl(τ |Xksl(τ), ω) is the conditional hazard function given no recommendation revision made at time
τ .
To write down the likelihood function, we introduce the column vector,
{
δksl(t) = (δ
0
ksl(t), δ
1
ksl(t), δ
2
ksl(t), δ
3
ksl(t), , δ
4
ksl(t), δ
5
ksl(t))
}
,
which is an indicator vector with {0, 1} elements, and ∑5j=0 δjksl(t) = 1. δ0ksl(t) = 1 indicates no change in
recommendation in [at−1, at), δ1ksl(t) indicates a revision to Strong Buy occurred within [at−1, at), δ
2
ksl(t)
indicates a revision to Buy, δ3ksl(t) indicates a revision to Hold, δ
4
ksl(t) indicates a revision to Sell or Strong
Sell, and δ5ksl(t) indicates that coverage was dropped within [at−1, at):
δjksl(t) =
 1, type j revision occurs in [at−1, at)0, no type j revision occurs in [at−1, at).
For an analyst k who makes a recommendation revision j about stock s at time T jksl, we observe the triple(
T jksl, δksl, Xksl
)
, where δjksl = 1. This observation contributes to the likelihood function with:
Ljksl =
[
λjksl
(
T jksl|Xksl(T jksl), ω
)]
Sksl
(
T jksl − 1|Xksl(T jksl − 1), ω
)
=
[
λjksl
(
T jksl|Xksl(T jksl), ω
)] T jksl−1∏
τ=1
λ0ksl (τ |Xksl(τ), ω) . (2.7)
When j = 0, δ0ksl = 1 means either that analyst k has not revised his recommendation about stock s by time
T 0ksl, or that the observation is censored at time T
0
ksl. Then this observation's contribution to the likelihood
function is actually the survival function up to time T 0ksl:
L0ksl =
[
λ0ksl
(
T jksl|Xksl(T 0ksl), ω
)] T 0ksl−1∏
τ=1
λ0ksl (τ |Xksl(τ), ω)
=
T 0ksl∏
τ=1
λ0ksl (τ |Xksl(τ), ω)
= Sksl
(
T 0ksl|Xksl(T 0ksl), ω
)
. (2.8)
Under the assumption that the recommendation durations are independent conditional on the observed and
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unobserved covariates, X(t) and ω, the full likelihood function is:2
L =
5∏
j=0
K∏
k=1
Sk∏
s=1
Lks∏
l=1

[(
λjksl
(
T jksl|Xksl
(
T jksl
)
, ω
))δjksl(T jksl)] T jksl−1∏
τ=1
λ0ksl (τ |Xksl(τ), ω)
 . (2.9)
Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2011) prove that the discrete-time competing risks hazard model is equivalent to
a multicategorical response model with multiperiod pseudo-observations in the form of likelihood (and they
show how to construct the multiperiod pseudo-observations). We model the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions
λjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) as a multinomial logit model with a logit link function, h(·) = exp(·)/{1 + exp(·)}:
λjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) = Pr
(
δjksl(t) = 1|Xksl(t), ω
)
=
exp(ηjksl(t))
1 +
∑5
h=1 exp(η
h
ksl(t))
, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
λ0ksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) = Pr
(
δ0ksl(t) = 1|Xksl(t), ω
)
=
1
1 +
∑5
h=1 exp(η
h
ksl(t))
. (2.10)
We let ηjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) = log
(
λjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) /λ0ksl (t|Xksl(t), ω)
)
represent the log odds of an event type
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 versus no event, j = 0.
We could estimate the ηjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) as a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) in which the
time-varying baseline hazard is speciﬁed by piece-wise constant baselines, and the time-varying eﬀects are
modeled by interaction terms between time and covariates. That is,
ηjksl(t) = α
j(t) +Xksl(t)
′
βj + ωk + ωs, (2.11)
where ωk ∼ N(0, σk) and ωs ∼ N(0, σs) are mutually independent, αj(t) is the piece-wise constant baseline
hazard for revision j, Xksl(t) are linear predictors, the vector βj are usual coeﬃcients and ωs and ωk are ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and analyst-speciﬁc frailties (random eﬀects). The GLMM approach is not overly computationally
intensive, but, as noted, to accommodate time-varying baseline hazard, and time varying eﬀects, one must
group time variables such as time since last recommendation into several intervals and represent them as
dummy variables. This explicitly imposes that baseline hazards for the covariates' eﬀects be piece-wise linear
and constant over each interval.
To avoid the information loss due to using dummy variables while accounting for the possibility of a time-
varying baseline hazard, nonlinear eﬀects of some covariates, complicated interactions between covariates,
2Cox (1962) and Tsiatis (1975) note that parameters describing association in dependent competing risks models are not
identiﬁable. For any joint survival function with arbitrary dependence between the diﬀerent terminating time distribution, one
can always ﬁnd a diﬀerent joint survival function with independent failure time distributions, which has the same cause-speciﬁc
hazards. In the competing risks model, the only estimable probabilities are those that can be uniquely determined by the
cause-speciﬁc hazards.
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and unobserved heterogeneity, we also model ηjksl (t|Xksl(t), ω) with a semiparametric model:
ηjksl(t) = Uksl(t)
′
βj + f j1 (x1ksl(t)) + · · ·+ f jp (xpksl(t)) + f j (x1ksl(t), x2ksl(t)) + · · ·+ ωk + ωs (2.12)
where ωk ∼ N(0, σk) and ωs ∼ N(0, σs) are mutually independent. In equation (2.12), Uksl(t) and
x1ksl(t), . . . , xpksl(t) are built from covariates Xksl(t). The vector βj contains the usual parametric linear ef-
fects of covariates Uksl(t). The f
j
1 , . . . , f
j
p are unknown smooth functions of the covariates x1ksl(t), . . . , xpksl(t)
respectively. If x(t) = t, then f j(t) models the time-varying baseline hazard for cause j; and if x(t) represents
some other covariate, then f j(x(t)) models the non-linear covariate eﬀects. Finally, we include the possibility
that the arguments in functions f j(·) are interactions between two covariates, i.e., f j(x1(t), x2(t)), in which
case f j(x1(t), x2(t)) is a two-dimensional surface. Finally, ωs and ωk are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and analyst-speciﬁc
frailties (random eﬀects).
Model (2.12) is referred to as the Generalized Additive Mixed Models (GAMM) in the statistics litera-
ture. It is an extension of Generalized Additive Models (GAM) proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1990).
GAM is a generalization of the linear regression model that replaces the usual linear function of a covari-
ate with a sum of unspeciﬁed smooth functions. By modeling the eﬀects of some continuous covariates or
time scales with splines, kernels, or other local smoothers, GAM can uncover the potentially non-linear and
complex interaction eﬀects of covariates. Since GAM is an additive model and each individual additive term
is estimated using a univariate smoother, it avoids the curse of dimensionality faced by most nonparamet-
ric methods. It has a very ﬂexible form but remains computationally feasible even for our huge analyst
recommendation data set.
GAMM extends GAM by introducing individual-speciﬁc random eﬀects to handle unobserved hetero-
geneity. Due to the complicated form of the GAMM model, fully Bayesian approaches based on MCMC
are often applied in estimation and inference (Ibrahim et al., 2001). Recently, Ruppert et al. (2003) sug-
gest a penalized likelihood approach based on a mixed model representation of linear regression splines.
By modeling the smooth terms as random eﬀects in mixed models, the nonparametric and random eﬀects
can be estimated in a uniﬁed framework using standard mixed modeling software (e.g., the NLMIXED or
GLIMMIX procedure in SAS). Inference can be performed on the basis of a multicategorical linear mixed
model representation. We employ this penalized likelihood approach. The reader is referred to the appendix
for the detailed modeling and inference procedures.
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Heterogeneity and Random Eﬀects
When we model the competing risks with a multinomial logit model, we do not need to assume the inde-
pendence of the pseudo-observations (see Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 2011), but we do need the conditional
independence of the observed durations T jksl. The data, however, involve recurrent events, as on rare occa-
sions an analyst made several recommendation revisions for the same stock during the study period. More
importantly, a particular stock is often followed by several analysts and each analyst makes recommenda-
tions for many stocks. The independence of the observed durations T jksl may not be valid in this context.
The revision time might be correlated through the unobserved frailties of the diﬀerent stocks and diﬀerent
analysts. Ignoring such sources of heterogeneity would not only lead to inﬂated standard errors, but would
induce serious biases in estimation.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, in analyzing longitudinal data, both ﬁxed and random eﬀects
model could be used. The ﬁxed eﬀects approach does not require independence between the ﬁxed eﬀects
and the eﬀects of other covariates. However, in our context, the ﬁxed eﬀects model is too ﬂexible. If we
treat analyst eﬀects as ﬁxed eﬀects, then analyst eﬀects can take on any value, so that each analyst is
completely diﬀerent from other analysts. Therefore, we cannot learn about analysts in general, and we could
not use the model to predict what a new analyst would do. In contrast, the random eﬀects model assumes
that analysts behave in broadly similar ways, so that a representative random sample of analysts for the
population of analysts allows us to make inferences about the entire population and to generalize results
beyond the analysts in the sample.
The structure of the recommendation data complicates estimation when we employ random eﬀects. In
contrast to a hierarchical model in which random eﬀects are nested, we must introduce analysts and stocks
as crossed random eﬀects, because one analyst usually covers several stocks and, any given stock is typically
followed by multiple analysts. Unobserved heterogeneities across analysts and stocks therefore overlap each
other. Fitting a model with crossed random eﬀects to our large recommendation data set is computationally
demanding. It takes several hours to ﬁt GLMM using a Quad-Core 2.66GHz with 8 GB memory, and it
turns out to be impossible when we apply GAMM with penalized splines. Therefore, we ﬁt the GLMM with
two crossed random eﬀects and only include analyst random eﬀects in our GAMM.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Most data come from the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) database. We obtain analyst
recommendations from the detailed recommendation ﬁle; and the discontinuation of coverage data come
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from the recommendation stopped estimates ﬁle. Because recommendation data are available on Wharton
Research Data Service (WRDS) only after October 29, 1993, our available sample period is from October
29, 1993 to December 31, 2009. However, several regulations came into eﬀect after October, 2000 to curb
conﬂicts of interests of analysts. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) came into eﬀect on October 23,
2000, the Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) in July 2002 and the Global Analyst Research Settlement
in December 2002. Researchers have documented how these regulations altered analyst recommendations
(Gintschel and Markov 2004, for Reg FD and Kadan et al. 2009, for SROs and Global Settlement). To avoid
contaminating our results with these structural changes, we focus on the sample period from October 29,
1993 to August 31, 2000.
We obtain earnings estimates and actual earnings per share (EPS) data from the IBES detail history
ﬁle. For the actual earning per share (EPS) data, the EPS data from I/B/E/S is preferable to those from
COMPUSTAT because the actual EPS from I/B/E/S (street earnings") is comparable to the analyst's
estimates of EPS, while COMPUSTAT EPS follows the generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP),
which is not directly comparable.
Our sample includes both common shares and ADRs (share codes 10, 11, 12, 18, 30, and 31 in CRSP)
traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ (exchange codes 1, 2, and 3 in CRSP). We exclude all stocks that
traded below $1 during the recommendation decision process. Stock returns and prices come from CRSP
daily database. Accounting data and earnings announcement dates (EAD) come from the S&P's COMPU-
STAT quarterly database. We link these three databases by the iclink ﬁle provided by WRDS. Institutional
ownership data are extracted from the Thomson Financial 13f institutional database, constructed from in-
stitutional investors' 13f ﬁlings. To investigate the eﬀect of brokerage pressure on analyst recommendations,
we proxy the size of the brokerage business by the number of registered retail representatives listed in the
Securities Industry Yearbook (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). To be included in the analysis, a recommendation
must be covered by each database.
For each recommendation revision, we collect the data as if analysts update information sets every 20
trading days. All ﬁnancial information, including past returns, earning estimates, and accounting variables
used by the analysts to make their decisions should be available at that time point. That means that the
actual earnings per share and other quarterly accounting information can only be used in forming analysts'
decisions after earnings have been announced. Figure 2.3 illustrates how data are collected for a particular
recommendation revision. In this case, the analyst made a BUY recommendation at day 0. For the ﬁrst
observation, we use the market-related data (e.g., past returns), analyst-related data (e.g., experience) and
broker-related data (e.g., investment banking relationship) observed at day −1. For accounting-related data
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(e.g., earnings and accruals), we use the information released at the earnings announcement date before
day 0, which is day −10. Then we update information other than accounting-related data every 20 trading
days up to the recommendation revision date, which is day 96. Accounting-related information is updated
once an earnings announcement is made. In this example, at days 60, 80, and 96, we use the accounting
information released on the second earnings announcement date.
 
Earnings Announcement Date 1
Observe Initial Covariates
Previous Buy Recommendation
Update Covariates
Update Covariates
Earnings Announcement Date 2
Update Covariates and Earnings
Update Covariates
Downgrade Recommendation to Sell
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Timeline
Figure 2.3: Timeline for how we generate the data. In this example, an analyst make a recommendation
revision from buy to sell with recommendation revision duration of 96 trading days.
2.3.1 IBES Recommendation Data
The IBES detailed recommendation ﬁle includes the recommendation date, and masked identiﬁers for the
brokerage house and the analyst issuing the recommendation. The recommendations rate stocks from 1 to
5: a rating of 1 reﬂects a strong buy" recommendation, 2 a buy", 3 a hold", 4 a underperform", and 5
a sell". To be consistent with past research and make ratings symmetric, we let 4 stand for sell" and 5
for strong sell". We use the IBES Stopped Recommendations ﬁle to identify discontinuation of coverage.
We treat a stopped recommendation record as a discontinuation of coverage only if there are no resumed
recommendations following it, or if the analysts are diﬀerent between two adjacent recommendations, which
implies that the analyst was replaced.
Table 2.1 shows the frequencies and percentages of the ﬁve rating categories. Most recommendations are
concentrated on Strong Buy, Buy and Hold, indicating that analysts are reluctant to issue sell and strong
sell recommendations. The second and third columns reveal that the regulations post August 31, 2000 led
to big increases in fractions of hold, sell and strong sell recommendations: post August 31, 2000, analysts
are more pessimistic" and Hold" might really mean hold.
Table 2.2 presents the transition matrix of analyst recommendations. There are 260, 679 recommenda-
tions. Of these, 156, 013 are recommendation revisions from one rating level to another. Although analysts
46
Table 2.1: Frequency Table for Analyst Recommendations
Panel A shows the frequencies and percentages of analysts' recommendations from October 29, 1993 to December 31,
2009, and for the subperiods October 29, 1993August 31, 2000 and January 01, 2004December 31, 2009. Panel
B shows the frequencies and percentages of recommendation and discontinuate coverage during those periods.
Panel A: Frequency of New Recommendations
Oct 29,1993- Dec 31, 2009 Oct 29,1993- Aug 31, 2000 Jan 01, 2004- Dec 31, 2009
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strong Buy 124227 24.57 62160 29.48 36605 20.46
Buy 151701 30.01 73781 35.00 42572 23.79
Hold 194055 38.38 66875 31.72 81017 45.27
Sell 22784 4.51 4251 2.02 12176 6.80
Strong Sell 12796 2.53 3765 1.79 6577 3.68
Panel B: Frequency of Dropping Coverage
Oct 29,1993- Dec 31, 2009 Oct 29,1993- Aug 31, 2000 Jan 01, 2004- Dec 31, 2009
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Recommendation 505563 78.39 210832 79.94 178947 78.35
Stop 139361 21.61 52900 20.06 49443 21.65
Table 2.2: Transition Matrix of Analyst Recommendations: Oct. 29, 1993Aug. 31, 2000
This table shows the frequencies of recommendation revisions from one category to another. For example, the ﬁrst
raw shows the number of revisions from 1 = Strong Buy to 2 = Buy, 3 = Hold, 4 = Sell, 5 = Strong Sell or 6 =
discontinuation of coverage. The numbers under the frequencies are the median durations of these recommendation
revisions. For example, there are 14459 downgrades from Strong Buy to Hold in our sample period and the median
duration of the downgrade from Strong Buy to Hold is 135 days.
To Recommendation of:
From 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Recommendation of: Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell Dropped
1 Strong Buy 6295 15668 14459 360 404 14017 51203
Median Durantion 129 125 135 103 84 197
2 Buy 15846 8752 20620 790 442 16123 62573
Median Durantion 99 120 116 120 78.5 178
3 Hold 9953 16297 4939 1665 1520 21141 55515
Median Durantion 96 112 164 93 93 205
4 Sell 163 584 1729 227 105 995 3803
Median Durantion 65 91 80 95 68 142
5 Strong Sell 260 337 1368 102 221 1065 3353
Median Durantion 58 85 73 73 82 141
First I/B/E/S 28291 30311 21841 1068 1018 1703 84232
Recommendation 33.59% 35.99% 25.93% 1.27% 1.21% 2.02%
Total 60808 71949 64956 4212 3710 55044 260679
% of total 23.33% 27.60% 24.92% 1.62% 1.42% 21.12% 100%
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are believed to be predominately optimistic, downgrades (54.57% of recommendation revisions) actually
outnumber upgrades (45.43% of recommendation revisions). However, one cannot conclude that analysts
are more likely to downgrade than upgrade recommendations, as initial recommendations are primarily
strong buy and buy recommendations (and one cannot upgrade from a strong buy). In our database, 84, 232
recommendations are categorized as ﬁrst recommendations, either because those recommendations actually
have no prior recommendations (initiating coverage) or because censoring at the beginning of the sample
period means that we missed the previous observation. Most ﬁrst recommendations are strong buy (33.6%)
and buy (36%), while initial hold (25.9%), sell (1.3%), and strong sell (1.2%) recommendations occur less
frequently than in the whole sample.
Table 2.2 also presents the median durations between the announcement of an old recommendation and
a revised recommendation. Median durations for downgrades are all far longer than their corresponding
median durations for upgrades. For instance, the median duration is 135 days from a strong buy to a hold,
but the median is only 96 days for an upgrade from a hold to a strong buy, a diﬀerence of almost 2 months.
Thus, once we take revision durations into account, analysts appear more reluctant to issue downgrades. Of
course, to conﬁrm this, we must control for other factors that determine the duration of a recommendation.
2.3.2 Time
There are two important time scales: time since last recommendation and time relative to earnings an-
nouncement dates.
• Time since last recommendation is the time elapsed since the previous recommendation was issued.
In our competing risks model, time since last recommendation is treated as the baseline time. When
we estimate a linear discrete time hazard model, the baseline hazards are assumed to be piecewise
constant in the intervals 1-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-13, and 14-24 months. When we estimate the baseline hazards
nonparametrically, they are modeled using penalized splines and assumed to change smoothly between
months.
• Time relative to earnings announcement date is the number of trading days relative to two
successive earnings announcement dates (EAD). As Figure 2.4 shows, recommendation revisions are
far more frequent on the earnings announcement date and on the succeeding 4 days. To account for
this clustering, `Time relative to earnings announcement date' is included as a time-varying covariate.
It can be either modeled as a continuous variable or as a dummy variable that equals one when time
is in a ﬁve-day interval after an earnings announcement date. Since the days between two earnings
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announcement dates vary for diﬀerent ﬁrms in diﬀerent quarters, when we treat time as a continuous
variable, we normalize time relative to earnings announcement date as
days_relative_to_ead =
days_after_first_ead
days_between_two_eads
,
where days_after_first_ead is days after the latest earnings announcement date before the obser-
vation date and days_between_two_eads represents the days between the current and next earnings
announcement date. Therefore, days_relative_to_ead ∈ [0, 1], where 0 indicates the current EAD
and 1 indicates the next EAD.
2.3.3 Measurement of Past Performance
To determine whether and how the past performance of an outstanding recommendation aﬀects an analyst's
recommendation decision, we need to identify a reasonable measure of performance. We ﬁrst examined
the disclosures of analysts regarding the meaning of their recommendations inside their reports. Table 2.3
presents these disclosures for 6 representative brokerage ﬁrms. As we can see from the table, the meaning
behind each recommendation vary from brokerage to brokerage, however, most brokerages describe their
recommendations by comparing their recommendations to a speciﬁc threshold return or a market/industry
benchmark. In these disclosures, the typical investment horizon for an analyst's recommendation is around
12 months. For instance,Merrile Lynch's analysts recommend a stock based on the expected total return
over the next 12 months since the recommendation.
Log Cumulative Returns Since Last Recommendation
In this paper, we measure the past performance of a particular recommendation by the logarithm of the
cumulative buy-and-hold returns up to the decision time. For example, if analyst k issues a recommendation
for ﬁrm s at time T0, for any decision time T after T0 and before the next recommendation, we calculate
the buy-and-hold raw returns between T0 and T ,
crets(T ) =
T∏
t=T0
rets(t),
where rets(t) is the raw return for stock s at time t. To make returns more symmetric around 0, we take
logarithm of crets(T ) to get lcrets(T ).
While log cumulative raw returns, lcrets(T ), provide a natural measure of the absolute performance of
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a recommendations, analysts may face a relative benchmark, where returns are measured relative to the
market or the stock's industry. We perform robust tests using log cumulative market-adjusted returns,
lmkt_cars(T ), and log cumulative industry-adjusted returns, lind_cars(T ). Market-adjusted returns are
computed by subtracting the daily value-weighted returns of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks,
retmkts (T ), for the relevant period from cumulative raw returns crets(T ),
mkt_cars(T ) =
T∏
t=T0
rets(t)−
T∏
t=T0
retmkts (t).
Industry adjusted returns (ind_cars(T )) are computed by subtracting the daily value weighted returns on
the portfolio of stocks in the same industry based on Fama-French 48 industry groupings,
ind_cars(T ) =
T∏
t=T0
rets(t)−
T∏
t=T0
retinds (t).
The corresponding logarithm returns are calculated in the same way as lcrets(T ).
Log cumulative buy-and-hold returns enter the regressions as time-varying covariates. On average the
magnitudes of absolute cumulative returns rise as time elapses, so the meaning of a given cumulative return
for what constitutes a good or bad performance will depend on time elapsed. To account for this time-varying
eﬀect of log cumulative returns, our parametric model employs interaction terms between log cumulative
returns and time dummies for 1-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-12, and 13-18 months; and our nonparametric model captures
the time-varying eﬀects using tensor product splines between log cumulative returns and time since last
recommendation.
In Figure 2.5 we show the performance of analysts' recommendations before Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Reg FD). The Figure illustrate the performance using the average cumulative raw returns and the excess
performance to the market, using the value-weighted returns of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.
To set up reasonable performance benchmarks for each recommendation level, we present the performance
of star analysts' recommendation. We also show the average cumulative returns of initial recommendations
which are not impacted by the upgrading or downgrading eﬀects.
As we can see from the ﬁgure, for all recommendation levels, the average cumulative raw returns are
positive for most periods form the recommendation date to the recommendation out to 360 trading days
after. On the other hand, the market-adjusted returns are moving in line with our expectations of the
recommendations, i.e. Strong Buy and Buy recommendations showed positive average returns, and Hold
and Sell recommendations indicate negative average returns.
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Figure 2.5: The average cumulative raw returns and market-adjusted returns up to the decision time for
each recommendation levels
2.3.4 Measures of Firm Characteristics
• Earnings Momentum (SUE). Since Ball and Brown (1968), the literature has documented the
ability of earnings surprises to predict future stock returns: stock returns continue to drift in the
direction of earnings surprises long after earnings are announced. Chan et al. (2001) show that the
earnings momentum strategies are proﬁtable even for larger stocks and that the proﬁtability cannot
be explained by the Fama-French three-factor model. SUE is measured as the diﬀerence between the
announced quarterly earnings and ﬁnancial analysts' forecasts of earnings scaled by the price per share
for that ﬁrm:
SUEs,q =
Eibess,q − Efs,q
Ps,q
,
where Eibess,q is the actual EPS reported in I/B/E/S for ﬁrm s in quarter q, E
f
s,q is the median of all
quarterly forecasts of EPS made by analysts in the 60 trading days prior to the earnings announcement
and Ps,q is the price per share for ﬁrm s at the end of quarter q from CRSP.
The information in SUE is freshest just after earnings are announced, suggesting that the eﬀects of SUE
on recommendation revisions may be stronger then. This means that we should allow the eﬀects of SUE
on the hazards of recommendation revisions to vary with the time relative to earnings announcement
dates. We accommodate such time-varying eﬀects in our parametric model with interaction terms
between SUE and a dummy variable that is one when time is in the ﬁve-day interval after an earnings
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announcement. Our nonparametric model uses tensor product splines between SUE and time relative
to earnings announcement dates.
2.3.5 Fundamentals
Analysts obviously weigh information about a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial health  its proﬁts and cash ﬂows  in
their recommendations. We use Return on Assets (ROA) to measure proﬁtability, and accruals to measure
earnings quality.
• Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as quarterly earnings from I/B/E/S for quarter q scaled by
total assets at the beginning of the quarter. To account for the seasonality of earnings, we construct
ROA as
ROAq =
∑4
i=1Earningq−i
TAq
,
where q is the quarter of the observation date t, therefore
∑4
i=1 Earningq−i
TAq
is the rolling sum of earnings
for the preceding four quarters, which can be observed by analysts.
• Accounting Accruals represent the diﬀerence between a ﬁrms' reported earnings and its underlying
operating cash ﬂow. This measure of earnings quality has predictive power for future stock returns.
Sloan (1996) ﬁnds that stock with high accruals, which indicate that earnings are much higher than
cash ﬂows, subsequently have lower returns and underperform stocks with lower accruals. Bradshaw
et al. (2001) show that analyst forecast errorsthe diﬀerence between reported and forecasted earnings
(scaled by price) are negatively associated with the level of accruals. They conclude that even profes-
sional ﬁnancial analysts who specialize in interpreting accounting information do not alert investors to
the subsequent earnings problems associated with high accruals. Our paper focuses on recommenda-
tions rather than forecasts: we investigate whether analyst recommendations reﬂect the information
contained in accruals.
• Sales Growth (SG) over the past year is included as a growth indicator. Lakonishok et al. (1994)
show that ﬁrms with high sales growth rates earn lower future returns, suggesting that stocks with
high growth rates are overvalued glamor stocks. We construct sales growth as
SG =
∑4
i=1 Salesq−i∑4
i=1 Salesq−4−i
,
where q is the quarter of the observation date t, therefore
∑4
i=1 Salesq−i is the rolling sum of sales
for the preceding four quarters, which can be observed by analysts, and
∑4
i=1 Salesq−4−i is the rolling
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sum of sales for the four quarters preceding one year before date t.
• Book-to-Market Ratio (BM) has been known to predict future returns since Fama and French
(1992): high BM ﬁrms earn higher returns than low BM ﬁrms, where
BM =
Book_V aluet
Market_V aluet
.
Book_V aluet is the book value of total common equity at time t and Market_V aluet is calculated
as the price at time t multiplied by common shares outstanding at time t.
• Firm's Market Beta and Size are included to control for the ﬁrm's risk. Following Fama and
French (1992), we calculate the ﬁrm's market beta with the Scholes and Williams (1977) method using
one year daily returns before the end of the previous year. Firm size is computed as the logarithm of
its market capitalization at time t.
• Institutional Holding has been considered a proxy of ownership by smart money investors. More-
over, these institutions determine the Institutional Investor All American Team. Ljungqvist et al.
(2007) ﬁnd that high institutional holdings may reduce upward biases in analyst recommendations.
We measure `Institutional Holding' as the percent of shares held by institutions, computed as the pro-
portion of the ﬁrm's outstanding shares held by all reporting institutional investors at the end of the
quarter. Data on institutional holdings are from Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum Institutional
Holdings Data.
2.3.6 Measures of Information Uncertainty
Following the literature, we proxy information uncertainty by two variables: ﬁrm age (AGE) and analyst
coverage (COVER).
• Age of Firms is included to capture the possibility that there is less information available about
younger ﬁrms. We measure ﬁrm age by the years since the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared in CRSP.
• Analyst Coverage is the number of analysts following a ﬁrm at time t. If more analysts follow a
ﬁrm, more information may become public, reducing uncertainty and information asymmetries.
2.3.7 Analyst Characteristics
• Experience (years since the analyst ﬁrst appeared in I/B/E/S database) captures pressures analysts
have to establish reputations, and possibly learning. More experienced analysts have a track record
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and may be less concerned about how incremental recommendations are viewed.
• Reputation (whether an analyst was on the Institutional Investor All-American research team in the
previous year) captures attributes of an analyst that may aﬀect recommendations.
2.3.8 Brokerage House Characteristics
• Investment Bank Relationships place pressure on analysts to bias recommendations upward. A
brokerage house is identiﬁed as having an investment bank relationship with a ﬁrm if it was a lead un-
derwriter(s) in the two-year time window following an equity oﬀering. Underwriting data are obtained
from Thomson Financial's SDC New Issues database. We include both initial public oﬀerings (IPOs)
and seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) of common stocks.
2.3.9 Measures of Future Performance
To determine if and when analysts make good recommendations, we must construct criteria for a recom-
mendation's proﬁtability. Consistent with past researchers such as Womack (1996) or Jegadeesh et al. (2004),
we deﬁne future returns as the logarithm of raw returns, lfretks(t), and market-adjusted returns, lfarks(t)
in the six months (120 trading days) after the decision time t. Future returns, lfretks(t), provide an ex-post
measure of analysts' ex-ante information, information that is not directly observable by econometricians. To
avoid endogeneity concerns, we compute returns using the closing price on the day prior to the beginning of
the period; our presumption is that while a recommendation revision will have a short-term impact on share
price, after 120 trading days, all information contained in the recommendation revision has become public,
so that recommendation revisions have no impact on the 120 day return. In robustness checks we use other
measures such as size-adjusted log returns or log returns over three months (60 trading days).
2.3.10 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics on all covariates except returns. Sell and strong sell recommendations
are not summarized in the table, due to the limited number of such recommendations. We primarily focus
on the analysis of recommendation revisions from strong buy, buy and hold, which account for 96.27% of all
recommendations in our sample. There are 14,716 strong buy, 19,238 buy, and 16,291 hold recommendations
included in our analysis. Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 2004), analysts favor
`glamor' stocks rather than `value' stocks in their recommendations, even though value stocks tend to earn
higher future returns (see Lakonishok et al., 1994). For strong buy recommendations, the mean (0.405) and
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median (0.33) of book-to-market ratios are lower than those for buy and hold recommendations. Also, stocks
with stronger past sales growth (SG), bigger positive earnings surprise (SUE), larger capitalization, higher
institutional ownership and less dispersion in analyst forecasts receive more positive recommendations.
Table 2.5 reports mean cumulative raw returns since the last recommendation for days 1 to 500 in 20-day
increments and future cumulative returns after the recommendation revisions were made. Save for upgrades
from buy, Panel A shows that the mean cumulative returns since the last recommendation for downgrades
(upgrades) are statistically signiﬁcantly lower (higher) than for recommendations that were not revised
in that period. As for future proﬁtability, Panel B shows statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
future cumulative returns of recommendation revisions and those for recommendations that were unchanged
over the same period. Table 2.5 provides evidence that analysts seem to prefer to downgrade (upgrade)
recommendations that performed worse (better) relative to others.
Figure 2.6 plots mean cumulative raw returns over Days -60 to +120. Together with Panel B of Table
2.5, this ﬁgure shows that, on average, analyst recommendation revisions predict future returns not only in
absolute values, but also relative to unchanged recommendations. Figure 2.6 reveals that analysts appear
to jump onto already moving bandwagons, i.e., that their recommendation revisions reﬂect recent past
returns, and that the pace of return cumulation accelerates over the ﬁrst 10 days, although returns continue
to drift monotonically to day +120. Note that due to this moving bandwagon eﬀect, on average, our future
raw return measures would be more sensitive to recommendation revisions with an initial window day of
−10 rather than day −1. However, investors, of course, cannot anticipate/act on a recommendation revision
that has not been issued.
 -15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
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Figure 2.6: The mean cumulative raw returns surrounding recommendation revision date
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2.4 Analyst Recommendation Revisions
In this section, we ﬁrst investigate the determinants of analyst recommendation revision decisions by ﬁtting
both discrete time linear hazard models and semiparametric hazard models separately for strong buy, buy
and hold recommendations. Our initial focus is on how the cause-speciﬁc hazards of analyst recommendation
revisions change with various incentives over time. Then, to understand the eﬀects of past performance on
the objectiveness of stock recommendations, we analyze the proﬁtability of analyst recommendation revisions
conditional on the past performance of outstanding recommendations. Finally, conditional on a particular
revision being made, we examine how the proﬁtability of an analyst's recommendation revision is aﬀected
by the past performance of the existing recommendation.
2.4.1 Determinants of Analyst Recommendation Revisions
Discrete Time Linear Hazard Models
To investigate the determinants of analyst recommendation revisions, we ﬁt the following discrete time linear
hazard model, in which the αs represent piece-wise constant baselines, the βs are the coeﬃcients on linear
eﬀects, and ωs are random eﬀects.
ηjksl(t) =α1(d1) + α2(d2) + α3(d3) + α4(d4) + α5(d5)
+ β1(d1× lcret) + β2(d2× lcret) + β3(d3× lcret) + β4(d4× lcret) + β5(d5× lcret)
+ β6(d1× lcret2) + β7(d2× lcret2) + β8(d3× lcret2) + β9(d4× lcret2) + β10(d5× lcret2)
+ β11ead+ β12(ead× sue) + β13((1− ead)× sue) + β14sp500 + β15roa+ β16accruals
+ β17sg + β18beme+ β19meanrec+ β20betav + β21lsize+ β22institutional
+ β23age+ β24numrec+ β25experience+ β26affiliated+ β27reputation
+ ind+ ωstock + ωanalyst
(2.13)
• d1−d5 are dummy variables representing 1-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, 9-12 months and 13-18
months after the issuance of theprevious recommendation [I/B/E/S];
• ead is a dummy variable that equals one when time is in a ﬁve-day interval after an earnings announce-
ment date [I/B/E/S];
• lcret is the log cumulative raw return since last recommendation [CRSP];
• sue is the standardized unexpected earnings, SUEs,q = (Eibess,q − Efs,q)/Ps,q, where q is the quarter of
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the observation date t [I/B/E/S][CRSP];
• sp500 is the Trailing one-year return of S&P 500 index; [CRSP]
• roa is the Return on Assets (ROA), roaq =
∑4
i=1Earningq−i/TAq, where q is the quarter of the
observation date t [COMPUSTAT];
• accurals is total accrual adjustments provided on the cash ﬂow statement under the indirect method
[COMPUSTAT];
• sg is the rate of growth in sales over the past year, sg =∑4i=1 Salesq−i/∑4i=1 Salesq−4−i, where q is
the quarter of the observation date t [COMPUSTAT];
• beme is the book-to-market ratio at time t [CRSP];
• meanrec is the consensus recommendation for the ﬁrm. [I/B/E/S Recommendations - Summary
Statistics File];
• betav is the ﬁrm's beta value;
• lsize is the logarithm of market capitalization of the ﬁrm [Compustat] [CSHOQ× PRCCQ]
• institutional is the percent of shares held by institutions, computed as the proportion of the ﬁrms
outstanding shares held by all reporting institutional investors at the end of the quarter [Thomson
Financial 13f institutional database];
• age is the years since the ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared in CRSP [CRSP];
• numrec is the number of analysts who cover the ﬁrm at time t [I/B/E/S Recommendations - Summary
Statistics File];
• experience is the years since the analyst ﬁrst appeared in I/B/E/S database [IBES];
• reputation is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the analyst was a member of Institutional
Investor All-American research team in the previous year [Institutional Investor ];
• affiliated is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst's brokerage house was a lead under-
writer in the two-year time window following an equity oﬀering [Thomson Financial's SDC New Issues
database];
• ind industries are deﬁned following Fama and French (1997);
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• ωstock is the random eﬀect for stocks;
• ωanalyst is the random eﬀect for analysts.
Semiparametric Hazard Models
To circumvent the weaknesses highlighted for the discrete time linear hazard model such as the arbitrarily-
chosen boundary (knot) locations for time dummies and predetermined functional forms of nonlinear eﬀects,
we ﬁt the following semiparametric hazard model using penalized splines,
ηjksl(t) =f1(duration) + f2(days_after_ead) + f3(duration, lcret) + f4(days_after_ead, sue)
+ f5(calendar_month) + f6(experience) + β1(sp500) + β2(roa) + β3(accurals) + β4(sg)
+ β5(beme) + β6(meanrec) + β7(betav) + β8(lsize) + β9(institutional) + β10(age)
+ β11(numrec) + β12(affilated) + β13(repuation) + ind+ ωanalyst,
(2.14)
where the fi(·) are functions without pre-speciﬁed functional forms, the βs are coeﬃcients for ordinary linear
eﬀects, the ωanalyst are analyst random eﬀects, and, in addition to the variables deﬁned above,
• duration is the time elapsed since the last recommendation was issued (time since last recommenda-
tion), which is measured in 20 day intervals [I/B/E/S];
• days_after_ead is normalized trading days after the previous earning announcement date [I/B/E/S];
• calendar_month is the calendar month of observational time [I/B/E/S].
Empirical Results
Table 2.6 presents the results from ﬁtting the linear discrete time hazard model. The reported coeﬃcients
are the linear eﬀects of covariates on the log-odds ratio of a corresponding recommendation revision versus
baseline category (no revision), log(λj/λ0). P-values are provided along with the estimates. The baseline
hazards are assumed to be piecewise constant at 1-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-12, and 13-18 months. All models are
estimated with crossed random-eﬀects, including both analyst and ﬁrm random eﬀects. To account for
potential industry eﬀects, we include 48 industry dummies, deﬁned following Fama and French (1997).
Figures 2.72.12 present the results from ﬁtting the semiparametric hazard model for the time-varying
eﬀects of both past performance and SUE. Figure 2.13 presents the nonlinear eﬀects of a set of covariates,
and Table 2.7 presents the linear eﬀects of other covariates.
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The eﬀect of past performance on analyst recommendation revisions
The meaning of a good and bad strong buy recommendation is clear: a strong buy is a better recommenda-
tion when the return is higher. So, too, very negative cumulative returns indicate a poorly-performing buy
recommendation; but it is less clear whether large positive cumulative returns indicate a good or bad buy rec-
ommendation, as it could have been a strong buy recommendation. For downgrades from strong buy and buy,
our measure of a recommendation's past performancelog cumulative returns since the recommendation
exhibits signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects on the hazards of downgrades. The quadratic eﬀects of log cumulative
returns are signiﬁcant and positive for downgrades from strong buy and buy.
The results suggest that the eﬀects of log cumulative returns on the hazards of downgrades from strong
buy and buy are neither linear nor time constant. In fact, the impact of log cumulative returns is ﬁrst
U-shaped shortly after a recommendationboth extremely bad and extremely good immediate performance
raise the likelihood of downgrades, but then, as time passes, better-performing (buy/strong buy) recommen-
dations linearly reduce the probability of a recommendation downgrade. For instance, in Table 2.6 Column
1 (downgrades from strong buy to buy), the coeﬃcients for the linear eﬀects of log cumulative returns are
−0.1592 at 3-5 months and −0.4801 at 9-12 months. The corresponding quadratic eﬀects of log cumulative
returns are 0.7615 at 3-5 months, but are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 9-12 months.
In contrast, for upgrades from buy and hold, the linear eﬀects of log cumulative returns are not statistically
signiﬁcant at most durations. However, this does not imply that log cumulative returns do not aﬀect
analyst recommendation revision decisions: the quadratic eﬀects of log cumulative returns are signiﬁcant
and negative at almost all durations, indicating that an absence of large changes in share price, and not the
direction of any changes, drive upgrades. Such inverse U-shaped eﬀects temper the positive main eﬀects and
render them insigniﬁcant in level.
The nonlinear time-varying eﬀects of past performance on recommendation revisions are more clearly
seen in the ﬁt of our semiparametric hazard model. Figures 2.7 to 2.9 depict the time-varying eﬀects of
past performance. Consistent with the ﬁt from the linear discrete time hazard model, negative cumulative
returns sharply raise the hazards of a downgrade from strong buy or buy, and reduce the hazards of an
upgrade from buy or hold. We also see that within 10 months of a strong buy or buy recommendation,
the hazards of downgrades also rise with better past positive performance. Thereafter, analysts are less
likely to downgrade if an outstanding recommendation performs well. In contrast to the impacts of negative
past cumulative returns, positive past cumulative returns do not exert a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
hazards of upgrades from buy (Figure 2.8) or hold (Figure 2.9). That is, once past cumulative returns become
positive, further increases in past cumulative returns do not make analysts more likely to upgrade. These
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ﬁndings indicate that positive past cumulative returns and negative past cumulative returns have asymmetric
impacts on analyst recommendation revision decisions. Poor past performance of a recommendation appears
to matter especially when returns are negative, i.e., when the recommendation was `optimistic'. In contrast,
if cumulative returns since the last recommendation are positive, analyst recommendation revision decisions
seem to be driven by other incentive tradeoﬀs.
Other incentive conﬂicts
Consistent with prior literature about the conﬂict interests of aﬃliated analysts, analysts in banks that have
investment banking relationships with the followed ﬁrms are more(less) likely to upgrade(downgrade) than
other analysts. However, our measure for brokerage pressure (the log annual number of registered retail
representatives) only exhibits an economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the hazards of upgrades
from buy to strong buy. Institutional investors also have strong inﬂuences on analysts recommendation
revision decisions: analysts are less likely to downgrade from strong buy and more likely to upgrade from
buy and hold for stocks with greater institutional ownership. This may reﬂect that institutional investors
are traditionally viewed as `smart money' investors and greater institutional ownership indicates better
investment values. Alternatively, these results could indicate that sell-side analysts have incentives to curry
favor with institutional investorsinstitutiional investors evaluate analysts in annual surveys such as the
Institutional Investor All-American Research Teams poll, and choose how to allocate trading commissions
across brokerage houses.
The eﬀects of accounting variables
Our results show that ﬁnancial analysts, as professional investment intermediaries who specialized in inter-
preting accounting information, account for the predictive power of SUE in their recommendation revisions.
The eﬀects of SUE on the hazards of recommendation revisions are highly sensitive to the time relative to
earnings announcement dates. Positive (negative) SUE dramatically raise the hazards of upgrades (down-
grades) immediately following earnings announcements, but the eﬀects become insigniﬁcant once ﬁve trading
days pass. Table V shows that higher (lower) SUE signiﬁcantly reduces (raises) the hazards of downgrades
(upgrades) in the ﬁve days after the earnings announcement dates, the period in which the information
contained in SUE is still fresh. After those ﬁve days, however, the eﬀects of SUE become statistically
insigniﬁcant for downgrades from strong buy and upgrades from buy, and economically insigniﬁcant for
downgrades from buy recommendation and upgrades from hold. Figures 2.10 to 2.12, which present the
results from ﬁtting the semiparametric hazard model, also clearly reveal this pattern.
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Figure 2.13: Nonlinear eﬀects with 95% point-wise conﬁdence intervals
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The positive eﬀects of accruals on the hazards of downgrades detailed in Table 2.6 suggest that analysts
signal earnings quality problems to retail investors via recommendation revisions. Figures 2.13(a) and 2.13(b)
show that impacts on downgrades are most evident in the high accruals regions where accruals are most likely
be distorted and manipulated. These ﬁndings regarding recommendations contrast with those in Bradshaw
et al. (2001) who examining the relations between analysts' earnings forecast errors and high accruals and
conclude that analysts do not recognize the future earnings problems associated with high accruals.
Higher ROA raise the likelihoods of downgrades from strong buy and buy, and reduce the likelihoods of
upgrades from hold to strong buy. So, too, higher past sales growth raise the likelihoods of downgrades to
hold, and reduce the likelihoods of upgrades from hold to buy The sign is counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance: one
might expect that higher ROA should indicate better ﬁnancial health and higher future returns. Plausibly,
this simply reﬂects a general preference of analysts for exciting growth stocks that appeal to retail clients
(relatedly, high β ﬁrms are less likely to be downgraded from strong buy to buy; and more likely to be
upgraded from buy to strong buy. if ﬁrms with higher ROA are overpriced, their stock prices would be
more likely to drop in the future and make higher hazards to be downgraded by analysts. The coeﬃcients
of sales growth are also positive, possibly for the same reason: Higher ROA and past sales growth rates are
characteristics of overpriced `glamor stocks' that would earn lower returns than `value stocks' in future if
the market corrects the mispricing.
The eﬀects of analyst and ﬁrm characteristics
Experience has negative eﬀects on all hazards: more senior analyst are less likely to revise recommendations.
The higher is an analyst's Institutional Investor ranking (the traditional proxy for an analyst's reputation),
the less likely the analyst is to drop coverage. Stars are also more likely to upgrade from hold and less likely
to downgrade from strong buy. Such observations could be explained by that analysts listed in such rankings
might have more freedom to choose which (attractive) stocks they cover and are more conﬁdent about the
stocks they picked.
Traditionally, larger ﬁrms, higher market beta and volatility are believed to draw more attention from
investors and analysts. Therefore, analysts are likely to follow them more closely and change their opinions
about the stock values more frequently. In addition, analysts seem to prefer stocks with lower book to market
ratios. They are likely to downgrade (upgrade) if the ﬁrms' book-to-market ratios are high (low). The high
correlation between book-to-market ratio and recommendation consensus makes it likely that book-to-market
ratios capture similar eﬀects to the recommendation consensus, which measures the diﬀerence between an
analyst's recommendation and those of other analysts'.
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2.4.2 Predictive Power of Recommendation Revisions
We have shown the performance of the outstanding recommendation, as captured by log cumulative returns
lcret, has time-varying eﬀects on the hazards of recommendation revisions. Moreover, the proﬁtability of
those recommendation revisions, lfar120, could vary according to a recommendation's past performance and
with the duration of the outstanding recommendation. To investigate these possibly complex interactions,
we ﬁt the following regression with f1 as a three-dimensional surface:
ηjksl(t) =f1(duration, lcret, lfar120) + f2(days_after_ead, sue) + f3(calendar_month) + f4(experience)
+ β1(sp500) + β2(roa) + β3(accurals) + β4(sg) + β5(beme) + β6(meanrec) + β7(betav)
+ β8(lsize) + β9(institutional) + β10(age) + β11(numrec) + β12(affilated) + β13(repuation)
+ ind+ ωanalyst
(2.15)
The goal behind this set of tests is to glean insights about how an analyst's incentive to manage his
or her reputation aﬀects the value of an analyst's recommendation or recommendation revision in terms of
predicting future performance. Figures 2.14 to 2.19 present the results of the three way interactions. Panels
in each ﬁgure show contour plots of the revision probability as a function of the log cumulative returns and
log future market-adjusted returns in the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 9th, 12th, and 16th month since the recommendation
was issued. Dark red (light yellow) represents predicted low (high) revision probability. Ideally, regardless
of the past performance of a recommendation, the probability of downgrades would rise when future returns
are lower/more negative, and fall when future returns are more positive; while the opposite should hold for
the probability of upgrades. Overall, analysts generally appear prescient: downgrades (upgrades) are more
likely when future returns are bad (good). However, the primary eﬀect that we see is that the contours
describing the probability of a revision are fairly ﬂat, as a function of future returnsrecommendation
revision probabilities are far more sensitive to the past performance of the recommendation (steeper contours)
than to the future performance.
This general appraisal conceals evidence that some recommendations are more informative than others.
As we can see from ﬁgure 2.14 (downgrades from strong buy to buy), ﬁgure 2.15 (downgrades from strong
buy to hold), and ﬁgure 2.17 (downgrades from strong buy to hold), in the the upper-left quadrant (high
past cumulative returns and low future returns) of the ﬁgures, for the ﬁrst several months, the probability
of downgrading is decreasing when future returns decline. However, for the 16th month panels, especially
in ﬁgure 2.17, the probability of downgrading is increasing when the future returns are lower. That means,
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at the early-stage of the recommendations, when past cumulative returns are positive, analysts fail to
downgrade strong buy and buy recommendations for stocks that subsequently incur huge future losses and
downgrades are more informative if the recommendations have been issued more than 1 year. On the other
hand, when past cumulative returns are very low, downgrades are becoming less informative as time goes
by. For example, in ﬁgure 2.14 (downgrades from strong buy to buy), for the 9th, 12th, and 16th month,
analysts are likely to downgrade stocks from strong buy to buy when the future returns are both very high
or very low. In particular, the probability of downgrading from strong buy to buy is maximized when the log
future market-adjusted returns, lfar120, are around 30% or -50%. Figure 2.16, ﬁgure 2.18, and ﬁgure 2.19
illustrate the interaction eﬀects of past cumulative returns and future returns on the probability of upgrading
from buy to strong buy, from hold to strong buy, and from hold to buy, respectively. These ﬁgures show
that analysts generally do a pretty good job in upgrading stocks. The probability of upgrading a stock is
particularly sensitive to the increase of the future returns, when past cumulative returns are negative.
The failure of analyst recommendation revisions to predict future returns in some states does not indicate
that analyst recommendation revisions do not have predictive power in general. Rather, our results serve to
point out situations in which analyst recommendation revisions do and do not contain valuable information
about future returns.
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Figure 2.14: Interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120) at
diﬀerent time points for downgrades from strong buy to buy.
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Figure 2.15: Interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120) at
diﬀerent time points for downgrades from strong buy to hold.
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Figure 2.16: Interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120) at
diﬀerent time points for upgrades from buy to strong buy.
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Figure 2.17: Interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120) at
diﬀerent time points for downgrades from buy to hold.
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Figure 2.18: The interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120)
at diﬀerent time points for upgrades from hold to strong buy.
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Figure 2.19: The interaction eﬀects of log cumulative returns (lcret) and log future market-adjusted returns (lfar120)
at diﬀerent time points for upgrades from hold to buy.
2.4.3 Relation between Past Performance and Future Returns
To further understand the relation between past performance and future returns, we investigate how analysts'
past performance aﬀect the proﬁtability for a particular recommendation revision. In this section, we only
include the observations that are revised in our sample. The observation time is the day analysts revise
their recommendations. The goal is to investigate, for observed recommendation revisions, whether the past
performance of an analyst's recommendation aﬀects the proﬁtability of their ﬁnancial advices.
For each recommendation level, we ﬁrst split stocks into ﬁve equal groups based on their cumulative
returns up to the revision date. Quintile 1 includes all recommendations whose past cumulative raw returns
are belong to the lowest 20% in a recommendation level and Quintile 5 means the highest 20%. Then, we
show the proﬁtability of each quintile using the cumulative returns from the revision date to 120 trading
days after. Cumulative return is set at zero on the close of the day the recommendation is revised. To
account for the time-varying eﬀects of the past performance, we further separate recommendations into two
group: (1) the recommendations which have been issued less than 12 months and (2) the recommendations
which have been issued more than 12 months. This split is based on the disclosures of brokerage ﬁrms in
table 2.3, which shows the typical investment horizon for an analyst's recommendation is around 12 months.
Figure 2.20 illustrates the cumulative returns of recommendation revisions for the recommendations which
have been issued less than 12 months. For downgrades, recommendations in the ﬁrst quintile (with lowest
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Figure 2.20: Cumulative raw returns of recommendation revisions for the recommendations which have been issued
less than 12 months. For each recommendation level, we group the recommendations based on their past cumulative
returns. Quintile 1 includes all recommendations whose past cumulative raw returns are belong to the lowest quintile
in that recommendation level and Quintile 5 means the highest quintile.
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Figure 2.21: Cumulative raw returns of recommendation revisions for the recommendations which have been issued
more than 12 months. For each recommendation level, we group the recommendations based on their past cumulative
returns. Quintile 1 includes all recommendations whose past cumulative raw returns are belong to the lowest quintile
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past cumulative raw returns), on average, have the lowest future returns, while recommendations in the ﬁfth
quintile have the highest. The results show that the downgrades are less informative for recommendations
with high past cumulative raw returns. However, as shown in ﬁgure 2.21, when recommendations have been
issued more than 12 months, downgrading strong buy and buy recommendations with low past cumulative
raw returns becomes less informative. For example, recommendations in the ﬁrst quintile (Quntile 1) have
the highest average future returns for downgrades from strong buy to sell and from buy to hold. On the
other hand, upgrades are generally proﬁtable irrespective of the past performance.
To control for other covariates, we further run regressions of future returns (measured as the market-
adjusted returns in the six months (120 trading days) after recommendation revisions) on the past perfor-
mance of outstanding recommendations and other characteristics deﬁned in the previous section. Table 2.8
reports the linear regression results. As we can see from the table, the eﬀects of stock characteristics on fu-
ture returns are very similar across diﬀerent recommendation revisions. Consistent with previous literature,
our results show that ﬁrms with low returns of asset, high past sales growth rates, high accruals, and high
book to market ratios earn lower subsequent returns. As expected, for each recommendation revision, the
eﬀects of log cumulative returns on future returns are nonlinear and time-varying.
To better illustrate the nonlinear time-varying eﬀects of past performance on future returns, we also ﬁt
semiparametric regressions where the log future market-adjusted return is speciﬁed as a function of the log
cumulative returns and time since last recommendation. Figure 2.22 presents the results. For upgrades,
past performance seems not exert adverse eﬀects on their proﬁtability. The future returns are higher when
the cumulative returns of the previous recommendations are very high or very low. For example, as shown
in the lower-middle panel of the ﬁgure 2.22, at the early-stage of the recommendation (i.e. less than 200
trading days), the future returns of upgrades from hold to strong buy are maximized when the log cumulative
returns are very high. As time passes, both high and low cumulative returns predict high future returns.
However, for downgrades, as the cumulative returns are getting negative, the future market-adjusted returns
increase a lot. In other words, when it is binding that the extra constraint on recommendation revision
decisions imposed by past performance pressure, and downgrades are driven by the incentive of getting rid
of ugly recommendations, analysts are more likely to make wrong decisions and the investment values of
such downgrades decline.
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Figure 2.22: Time varying eﬀects of log cumulative returns on the future returns of recommendation revisions. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of future 120-trading-day cumulative market-adjusted returns.
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2.5 Robustness Checks
Our measure for past performancecumulative returns since the recommendation was madeprovides a
natural measure of the absolute performance of analysts' recommendation, which we believe is consistent with
the perception of retail investors. However, the benchmarks analysts themselves base on could be the market
cumulative returns or industry cumulative returns for the same period. Therefore, we replicate the analysis
using alternate measures for past performance, cumulative market adjusted returns and cumulative industry
adjusted returns deﬁned in section 3.3. The general eﬀect of the past performance on recommendation
revisions is robust to the choice of measures.3
The analysts' assessed values for stocks represented by recommendation levels might depend on where the
recommendations come form. For instance, the analysts' assessed value for a buy recommendation which is
downgraded from strong buy might be quite diﬀerent compared with an initial buy. Therefore, to make the
sample as homogeneous as possible in the beginning of the revision processes, we further divide the sample
by the lagged recommendation levelsthe recommendations before the outstanding recommendations being
issued. Although, the patterns of how the past performance impacts on recommendation revisions are slightly
diﬀerent with diﬀerent lagged recommendation levels, the diﬀerence is not economically signiﬁcant and all
our main results survive.
Another concern is that the coarser categories of recommendation revisions downgrade, upgrade, and
drop we employ in the model could aﬀect our results. To rule out this possibility, competing risks are
deﬁned by speciﬁc recommendation levels. This change of speciﬁcation only complicates the analysis, but
does not alter the documented pattern of the impact of past performance on recommendations.
2.6 Conclusions
We apply ﬂexible semi-parametric survival analysis approaches to determine how the performance of ﬁnancial
analysts' outstanding recommendation aﬀects their decisions to revise recommendations. Poor performance
of the recommendations would make analysts more likely to follow price changes and revise recommendations
accordingly. Such extra constraint on recommendation revision decisions imposed by past performance is
binding only if the outstanding recommendations perform poorly. Conversely, if the outstanding recommen-
dations perform very well, the past performance constraint is relaxed and analyst recommendation revision
decisions are determined by the tradeoﬀ of other incentives. The past performance pressure not only aﬀects
analysts' recommendation behaviors, but also contaminates the objectiveness and investment values of an-
3Due to space constraints, we do not report these robustness results. All results are available upon request.
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alyst recommendation revisions. Using the predictive power of future abnormal returns as the criterion, we
show that if the outstanding recommendations perform well, analysts would behavior too optimistically and
are not able to detect potential price declines; while with good future returns, downgrades are more likely
following past poor performance than past good performance. Focusing on the revised recommendations
only, we ﬁnd that the investment values of downgrades decline when analysts make their decisions driven
by past performance pressure. In summary, our ﬁndings suggest that analysts' recommendation decision
processes are driven by some incentives which might not be aligned with investors. To appropriately assess
the informativeness and investment value of analyst recommendation revisions, we need to scrutinize the
underlying motives behind recommendation revisions. Beyond the conﬂicts of interest documented in prior
literature, analysts' incentives to manage their appearances in front of customer audience good-looking
recommendation lists signiﬁcantly inﬂuence analysts' recommendation behavior and further aﬀect the ob-
jectiveness and investment value of analyst recommendation revisions. Sometimes, maintaining a `good'
reputation might aggregate rather than alleviate the conﬂicts of interests.
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Appendix A
Penalized B-splines and Tensor Product
B-splines
In this section, we introduce penalized B-splines (P-splines) and their multi-dimensional extension tensor
product P-splines. Dierchx(1993) and Eilers and Marx (1996, 2003) provide a comprehensive introduction
to the theory of P-splines.
In general, a function can be expressed as a linear basis expansion in x,
f(x) =
M∑
m=1
γmBm(x) (A.1)
The basis functions Bm are B-spline base functions of degree g and with knots κm, · · · , κm+g+1 deﬁned
through the following recurrence relation:
Bgm(x) =
x− κm
κm+g − κmB
g−1
m (x) +
κm+g+1 − x
κm+g+1 − κm+1B
g−1
m+1(x)
B0m(x) =

1, x ∈ [κm, κm+1)
0, x /∈ [κm, κm+1)
Thus a B-spline extends over g+2 knots and is nonzero in the corresponding interval. Figure A.1 illustrates
linear, quadratic and cubic B-spline basis functions. In this study, we use cubic B-splines to approximate
the unknown smooth functions.
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Figure A.1: B-spline basis functions of linear, quadratic and cubic degree (left to right)
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To ﬁt a two-dimensional surface with time-varying eﬀects, f(t, x), the basis function must be extended
to two dimensions (t, x) ∈ R2. The computationally-eﬃcient approach that we employ to to do this is to use
a tensor product of one-dimensional cubic B-splines:
f(t, x) =
∑
r
cr
(
P∑
p=1
arpBp(t)
)
⊗
(
Q∑
q=1
brqBq(x)
)
(A.2)
=
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
γpqBp(t)⊗Bq(x). (A.3)
This approach is numerically stable. The ﬁtted surface is deﬁned by the coeﬃcients of a small number of
tensor product B-splines. That is, this modeling approach creates a design matrix for the two-dimensional
function by ﬁrst generating the B-spline basis functions for the covariates, x, and the time since last recom-
mendation, t, and then calculating all pairwise products of the basis functions. Hence, the dimensions are
low. Figure A.2 shows representatives of diﬀerent degrees of B-splines.
Continuing, we can create a smooth function of three dimensions by allowing f(t, x) to vary smoothly
with a third variable v,
f(t, x, v) =
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
R∑
r=1
γpqkBp(t)⊗Bq(x)⊗Br(v).
Penalty for `Wiggliness'
In our model, we measure the `wiggliness' of function f(x) =
∑M
m=1 γmBm(x) by the integrated square of
the second-derivative penalty
J(fx) =
∫
[f ′′(x)]2dx
which is larger if f is very wiggly and small if f is ﬂat. Because
f ′(x) =
M∑
m=1
γmB
′
m(x), f
′′(x) =
M∑
m=1
γmB
′′
m(x),
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48 3. Space-Varying Coefficients Model (SVCM) using 3d B-splines
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Figure 3.3: Surface and contour plots of 2d B-spline basis functions of linear, quadratic, and
cubic degree (left to right).
attenuated but still present for the quadratic case, and only from cubic degree on hardly
visible to the human eye. In principle, a dimension specific degree is conceivable.
A 2d surface spline can consequently be represented by a linear combination of basis
functions Bgkl(x, y). Figure 3.4 gives a schematic impression of the linear expansion in
(x, y).
Generalization to further dimensions is straightforward but lacks graphical visualization.
Penalization is particularly indispensible in higher dimensions as the number of basis
functions grows exponentially. Thereby it holds that the effective number of degrees of
freedom and, thus, the flexibility of the penalized spline falls between the penalty order
and the number of basis functions.
3.3.2 Multidimensional smoothing with tensor products
The elements of βj = {βj(s), s = 1, . . . , n}, j = 1, . . . , p, are modelled non-parametrically
by projecting them onto penalized tensor product B-splines or multidimensional P-splines.
Figure A.2: Surface and contour graphs of 2d tensor product B-spline basis functions of linear, quadratic
and cubic degree (left to right)
we can write
J(fx) =
∫
[f ′′(x)]2dx =
∫
[
M∑
m=1
γmB
′′
m(x)]
2dx
=
∫
γTB′′(x)TB′′(x)γdx
= γTSγ, (A.4)
where γ is the vector of coeﬃcients, B′′(x) is the vector of second derivatives of the B-splines basis functions
evaluated at x, and S =
∫
B′′(x)TB′′(x)dx. Therefore, we can express the penalty J(f) as a quadratic form
in the parameter vector γ.
Following Wood (2006), we measure the wiggliness for tensor product splines with separate penalties
associated with each covariate. For a three-way interaction function like f(t, x, v), three wiggliness penalties
ar introduced for the ree covariate direc ions of f ,
γTS˜Tγ where S˜T = S˜t ⊗ IX ⊗ IV
γTS˜Xγ where S˜X = IT ⊗ S˜x ⊗ IV
γTS˜Vγ where S˜V = IT ⊗ IX ⊗ S˜v.
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Then, given a wiggliness measure for each function, we can deﬁne a penalized likelihood for the model as
lpen(γ) = l(γ)− 1
2
∑
i
λiγ
TSiγ, (A.5)
where l(γ) is the logarithm of the likelihood function (2.9). The smoothing parameters λi control the trade-
oﬀ between goodness of ﬁt and smoothness. As we describe next in detail, after a re-parameterization we
can estimate λi as variance components of a linear mixed model simultaneously with the coeﬃcients γ.
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Appendix B
Estimation Procedure and Inference in
Mixed Model Representation
The penalized log-likelihood (A.5) can be viewed as a generalized linear mixed model because the wiggliness
of the model are assumed to have random eﬀects or a prior distribution that is proportional to −λγTSγ/2.
However, because such a prior implies an improper Gaussian prior for γ, estimates for the smoothing param-
eters λi cannot be obtained by directly maximizing this penalized likelihood (A.5). To ﬁt in the standard
generalized linear mixed modeling approach, the model must be reparametrized to obtain random eﬀects
with proper priors.
For single dimension smooths
f(xi) =
M∑
m=1
γmBm(xi) = X
T
i γ, (B.1)
where the vector Xi = (B1(xi), . . . , BM (xi))T consists of the basis functions Bm(·) evaluated at the ob-
servation xi. In the penalty for wiggliness, J(f) = γTSγ, the generally rank-deﬁcient matrix S can be
decomposed by the eigen-decomposition, S = UDUT, where D is the diagonal matrix corresponding eigen-
values arranged in descending order on the leading diagonal. Let D+ be the sub-matrix of D with non-zero
eigenvalues and decompose the vectors of regression coeﬃcients γ into an unpenalized part γunp, and a
penalized part γpen, which has the same dimension as D+, so that the new coeﬃcient vector can be written
as (γTpen, γ
T
unp)
T ≡ UTγ. Therefore, we have γTSγ = γTpenD+γpen, and the coeﬃcients γunp are unpenalized.
Partition the eigenvector matrix so that U ≡ [Upen : Uunp], where Upen has the same dimension as D+,
and deﬁne Xpen ≡ XUpen and Xunp ≡ XUunp. Then we can represent the smooth function f(·) using a
mixed model with ﬁxed eﬀects γunp and random eﬀects γpen,
Xunpγunp +Xpenγpen where γpen ∼ N(0, D−1+ /λ). (B.2)
To estimate with standard software, we further re-parameterize b = D+
1
2 γpen and Z = XpenD+−
1
2 .
95
Then, the mixed model representation is
Xunpγunp + Zb where b ∼ N(0, I/λ). (B.3)
For tensor product smooths, with a similar reparameterization, we have
Xunpγunp + Zb where b ∼ N(0, (
∑
λiSi)
−1). (B.4)
Then, model (2.12) can be written
ηjksl(t) = Uksl(t)
′
βj + f j1 (x1ksl(t)) + · · ·+ f jp (xpksl(t)) + f j (x1ksl(t), x2ksl(t)) + · · ·+ ωk + ωs
= Uksl(t)
′
βj +X(t)junpγ
j
unp + Z(t)1b1 + Z(t)2b2 + Z(t)3b4 + · · ·+ ωk + ωs, (B.5)
where b1 ∼ N(0, I/λ1) b2 ∼ N(0, I/λ2) b3 ∼ N(0, I/λ3) . . . and ωk ∼ N(0, Iσ2k), ωs ∼ N(0, Iσ2s).
Now, the model can be estimated as a standard linear mixed model using R routine lme4 or glmmPQL
by treating γunp as ﬁxed eﬀects and b as normally-distributed random eﬀects. The smoothing parameter
λ is estimated as a variance component using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) or using a penalized
quasi-likelihood (PQL) approach. Kneib and Fahrmeir (2006) provide a detailed discussion of the estimation
and inference procedures.
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Appendix C
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve
and Area Under Receiver Operating
Characteristic
The ROC curve was developed in signal detection theory, and widely applied in biostatistics and economet-
rics. If a model perfectly predicts defaults, then the distributions of defaulters and non-defaulters would
be separate, as in Figure C.1(b). In practice, perfect discrimination is not possible, and the distributions
overlap. A cut-oﬀ value C as in Figure C.1(a) provides a decision rule that divides all debtors into defaulters
and non-defaulters: Each debtor with a score lower than C is classiﬁed as a defaulter, and each debtor with
a score higher than C is classiﬁed as a non-defaulter. Figure C.1(a) illustrates the four possible decision re-
sults: `correct alarm', `correct non-alarm', `false alarm' (Type II error) and `false non-alarm' (Type I error).
Contingency Table C.1 presents these possibilities in percentage form. Each column sums to unity, so once
we know one element, the other can be inferred. For a given cut-oﬀ C, the number of correctly-predicted
defaults as a percentage of the true number of defaults is given by the correct alarm rate (CAR) (also called
`hit rate' or `sensitivity'):
CAR(C) =
Correct alarms(C)
Defaults
. (C.1)
For a given cut-oﬀ C, the number of incorrectly-predicted defaults as a percentage of the true number of
non-defaults is given by the false alarm rate (FAR) (or `1-speciﬁcity'):
FAR(C) =
False alarms(C)
Non-defaults
. (C.2)
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Figure C.1: Distribution of rating scores for defaulting and non-defaulting debtors
Table C.1: Contingency table
Default Non-default
Default forecast
Correct alarms False alarms
Defaults Non-defaults
(Sensitivity) (1-Speciﬁcity)
Non-default forecast
False non-alarms Correct non-alarms
Defaults Non-defaults
(1-Sensitivity) (Speciﬁcity)
The contingency table reveals the complete picture of model performance, if the predicting model only
classiﬁes all debtors into two basic classes, default and non-default. If the model contains more than two
categories, or produces continuous outputs, such as default probabilities, the deﬁnition of default would
depend on the subjective cut-oﬀ, C. The ROC curve was introduced to address this subjectivity by describing
graphically the model's performance for all possible cut-oﬀs. The ROC curve plots CAR(C) versus FAR(C)
for all possible cut-oﬀs C (see Figure C.2).
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Figure C.2: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
Figure C.2 plots three possible ROC curves. A perfect model would correctly predict the full number of
defaults and would correspond to the horizontal line with 100% correct alarms. In contrast, a model with
zero discriminatory power corresponds to the 45 degree line. Any model with intermediate discriminatory
power would be represented by a concave curve positioned between the two extremes. For a given cut-oﬀ C,
the horizontal axis yields the `false alarm rate' (Type II error) and the complement of vertical axis yields
the `false non-alarm rate' (Type I error). Thus, a more accurate model yields a steeper ROC curve to the
left, and greater area under the ROC curve, which is given by the shaded area A in Figure C.2.
The shaded area A in Figure C.2 is called the area under the ROC curve (AUROC). It summarizes the
information in the ROC curve into a single statistic:
AUROC =
∫ 1
0
CAR(FAR)dFAR. (C.3)
The AUROC statistic takes on values between 0.5 and one, where an AUROC of 0.5 corresponds to a random
model without power and an AUROC of 1 corresponds to a perfect model. A rough guide for classifying the
accuracy of a default model is: 0.90− 1.00 = excellent; 0.80− 0.90 = good; 0.70− 0.80 = fair; 0.60− 0.70 =
poor; 0.50− 0.60 = fail.
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Appendix D
Constructing Multiperiod
Pseudo-observations for Discrete Time
Competing Risks Hazard Models
A discrete time competing risks hazard model can be written as and estimated by a multicategorical response
model with multiperiod pseudo-observations (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002)). In this section, we illustrate
how to construct the multiperiod pseudo-observations for recommendation revision data. Suppose we have
data with 4 analysts issuing buy recommendations. The sample duration is truncated in month 5. The ﬁrst
analyst maintains her buy recommendation (j = 0) so that the observed duration time is 5. The second
analyst downgrades (j = 3) her buy to hold in the 3rd month. The third analyst upgrades (j = 1) her
recommendation to strong buy in the 4th month and the fourth analyst drops coverage (j = 5) in the 2nd
month. For this sample, we construct the multiperiod pseudo-observations for recommendation revisions as
follows:
y analyst id duration time‐varying covariate: x1 time‐constant covariate: x2
0 1 1 0.1 1
0 1 2 0.3 1
0 1 3 0.5 1
0 1 4 0.4 1
0 1 5 0.6 1
0 2 1 ‐0.2 0
0 2 2 ‐0.4 0
3 2 3 ‐0.5 0
0 3 1 0.2 1
0 3 2 0.4 1
0 3 3 0.5 1
1 3 4 0.7 1
0 4 1 0.1 0
5 4 2 ‐0.2 0
For the ﬁrst analyst, we create 5 observations since the observed duration is 5months. The event indicator
y equals 0 each period. For the second analyst we have 3 observations and event indicator jumps at month 3
from 0 to 3. For the third analyst, the event indicator jumps at time 4 from 0 to 1, and the event indicator
100
for the fourth analyst jumps at time 2 from 0 to 5. With this constructed data set, we can estimate the
competing risks hazard model as a multinomial logit model with y as the response and covariates: duration,
time-varying covariate x1, and time-constant covariate x2.
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